# Digital Disruption Series -1 <br> Asia Retail Sector 

## DBS Group Research . Equity

## Online onslaught or virtual awakening?

- Structural difference in US \& China ecommerce markets to have big implications
- Internet giants in China to grow rapidly as traditional retailers are not ready yet.
- Higher disruption in China than ASEAN; tier 35 cities in China to face more heat
- Department stores and cosmetic retailers are likely to see more disruption while lifestyle and luxury retailers may be more resilient

Structural difference in US \& China e-commerce markets. In US and other developed markets, most of the online retailing occur over the traditional retailers' own websites (such as Best Buy, Macy's etc) or online retailers (such as Amazon). By contrast, most online retailing in China occurs on virtual marketplaces such as Taobao and Tmall. Online-to-Offline (O2O) offerings help traditional retailers to take advantage of their physical presence yet retailers in China remain in the early stage of O2O strategies. Retail operators that do not have their own products could face even more challenges from pure online players

Internet players in China to benefit from solid user growth. iResearch forecasts e-commerce revenue CAGR of $27 \%$ over 2014-17 in China. Traditional retailers clearly lag in adopting O2O offerings on three key metrics (see inside). Meanwhile, Internet players are likely to see solid growth in user base as only $49 \%$ of netizens used e-commerce in China in 2013 versus 76\% in US and $97 \%$ in UK. Department stores and cosmetic retailers (non brand owners) are likely to see more competition from Internet players while those selling lifestyle and luxury products may be more resilient.

Higher disruption in China than in ASEAN. Online sales comprised $\sim 10 \%$ of retail sales in China in 2014 versus only $\sim 1 \%$ in ASEAN. Traditional retailers have an uphill task in tier-3 or lower-tier cities in China where many brands and products are still mainly available online. We expect a gradual loss of market share for traditional retailers in Singapore with rising labour costs hurting them further. On the other hand, traditional retailers in Thailand are quite pro- active in promoting online sales. The potential threat from e-commerce is still low in Malaysia and Indonesia over the next three years.

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| Screening stocks based on 3-year horizon |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | PE | PE | Div Yld |  |  |
|  | Crncy | Price | Mkt Cap (US\$m) | FY15F (x) | FY16F (x) | FY14 (\%) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { EPS CAGR } \\ & (14-16) \end{aligned}$ | Rating |
| Winners <br> China (US-listed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alibaba Group * | USD | 84.90 | 209,279 | 30.5 | 22.9 | 0.0 | 30.6 | NR |
| J. com Inc | USD | 35.02 | 48,505 | 678.3 | 149.7 | 0.0 | 135.4 | Buy |
| Resilient |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HK/China |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Chow Tai Fook* | HKD | 9.86 | 12,722 | 13.8 | 12.4 | 2.7 | 14.0 | NR |
| Chow Sang Sang | HKD | 17.88 | 1,562 | 10.2 | 9.0 | 3.4 | 11.9 | Buy |
| Luk Fook* | HKD | 25.10 | 1,908 | 8.9 | 8.0 | 4.3 | 8.0 | Buy |
| Singapore |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Hour Glass Ltd | SGD | 0.80 | 428 | - | - | 2.5 | - | NR |
| Cortina Holdings | SGD | 0.80 | 101 | - | - | 2.5 | - | NR |
| Sheng Siong | SGD | 0.84 | 951 | 23.9 | 22.7 | 3.4 | 8.8 | Buy |
| Thailand |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Officemate | тHB | 61.25 | 600 | 37.5 | 31.0 | 1.0 | 18.4 | NR |
| Big C Supercenter | тНВ | 226.00 | 5,721 | 22.5 | 20.0 | 1.1 | 13.0 | NR |
| CP ALL PCL | THB | 42.75 | 11,783 | 28.9 | 23.0 | 1.9 | 27.2 | NR |
| Challenged |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| China (HK-listed) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Springland | HKD | 3.03 | 954 | 9.4 | 8.8 | 5.5 | 4.0 | Hold |
| Golden Eagle | HKD | 11.44 | 2,636 | 14.9 | 13.4 | 2.6 | 13.0 | Hold |
| Sun Art Retail | HKD | 8.16 | 10,044 | 22.1 | 21.1 | 2.0 | 1.0 | FV |
| Intime Department | HKD | 8.86 | 2,484 | 19.9 | 18.5 | 3.1 | -2.5 | Hold |
| Parkson | HKD | 1.92 | 678 | 17.8 | 11.8 | 3.2 | 25.1 | FV |
| Singapore |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| FJ Benjamin | SGD | 0.134 | 58 | - | - | 1.3 | - | NR |
| * FY15: FY16; FY16: FY17 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Source: DBS B | nk, DBS | Vickers, | s, Bloom | erg Fina | nce L.P. |  |  |  |

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## Investment Summary

Higher disruption in China than in ASEAN. Online sales comprised $\sim 10 \%$ of retail sales in China in 2014 versus only $\sim 1 \%$ in ASEAN. Traditional retailers have an uphill task in tier-3 or lower-tier cities in China where many brands and products are still mainly available online. In Singapore, we expect a gradual loss of market share for traditional retailers with rising labour costs hurting them further. On the other hand, traditional retailers in Thailand are quite pro- active in promoting online sales. The potential threat from e-commerce is still low in Malaysia and Indonesia over the next three years.

Who will be the winners in the medium term? Internet players are likely to see solid growth in user base as only 49\% of netizens used e-commerce in China in 2013, versus $76 \%$ in US and $97 \%$ in UK. We have ranked major online players Alibaba Group, Tencent, JD.com and Baidu - according to their capabilities in monetization, payments, logistics and Offline to Online (O2O) strategies. Particularly, we believe functions that could play important roles in O 2 O include group buying, mobile maps, and online advertising solutions that help offline players increase sales. In our view, Alibaba and JD.com score better in monetization potential thanks to their e-commerce exposure; Alipay (related party of Alibaba Group) is well-poised to lead in the burgeoning online payment industry, followed by Tencent's social network-based payment solutions; Alibaba and JD.com stand out in logistics, thanks to Alibaba's development of smart logistics IT system and JD.com's self-operated logistics model; Baidu and Tencent could fare better in O2O development, aided by their initiatives in mobile maps and performance-based advertising solutions for offline store operators.

## DBSV ranking system for Internet Players in China

|  | Baidu | Alibaba | Tencent | JD.com |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Monetization potential | $\star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star \star$ |
| Payment capability | $\star \star$ | $\star \star \star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star$ | $\star \star$ |
| Logistics development | - | $\star \star \star \star \star$ | $\star$ | $\star \star \star \star \star$ |
| 020 potential | $\star \star \star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star \star \star$ | $\star \star$ |
| ToTAL | $\star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star \star y$ | $\star \star \star$ | $\star \star \star$ |

## Source: DBS Vickers

Who may be challenged in the medium term? Operators that are positioned in the lower-end and mass-market segments could face stronger rivalry from pure online plays than luxury groups. Product categories including apparel \& footwear and electronic \& 3C products could be more prone to competition from online players. Handbag \& luggage, cosmetics, home appliances and food products could also see some competition from pure e-commerce operators.

Retail stores in Tier 3-5 cities in China still do not have welldeveloped retail infrastructure. As such, people in these lowertier cities buy a wide range of products via e-commerce that is more readily available to them than physical store offerings. Department stores in China such as Golden Eagle, Intime, Parkson, Springland and hypermarket /supermarket operators such as Sun Art have a lot of work to do due to their high exposure to lower-tier cities (see chart below). Fashion and watch retailer FJ Benjamin in Singapore may also face challenges due to its low sales per square foot and high urban footprint. To justify costly rental expenses, these companies need to start building large sales contribution from online channels in addition to revenue from brick-and-mortar outlets

Who would be more resilient in the medium term? For instance, luxury goods sellers in Asia (e.g. jewellery, luxury watches, global premium brands) could be less affected in terms of direct competition from online players. Jewellery retailers in China such as Chow Tai Fook, Chow Sang Sang and Luk Fook may be more resilient as consumers may not want to buy such expensive products online due to concerns on product quality while they also prefer to see how the gemsets shine under the lights. Store operators are keen to invite them into their stores as these 3 jewellery retailers have built their name in China. Luxury watch retailers such as Hour Glass and Cortina Holdings in Singapore are also likely to be resilient due to their high-end product mix.

Besides, retailers with high exposure to suburban locations in Singapore may also prove resilient. These shops provide many popular product and brands along with the convenience of shopping nearby residential homes for instant satisfaction, versus waiting for e-commerce to deliver the products. Suburban shops also benefit from lower rental expenses compared to city-centre shops. Sheng Siong, the grocery retailer in Singapore, is likely to be resilient despite relatively lower sales per square footage amid its high suburban footprint and significant contribution from fresh food.

In addition, traditional retailers in Thailand - Big C, Officemate and CP ALL are quite pro-active in promoting e-commerce sales and are likely to be resilient too. They should be able to benefit from a pick-up in e-commerce sales in ASEAN over the medium term

Key Retailers in China - Sales per square feet versus percentage of stores in tier-1 cities


Source: DBS Vickers (Note: The chart focuses to gauge operating landscape with respect to online development in China. Hypermarket / supermarket players could face other challenges a bit more, particularly related to the swift increase in staff costs and start-up costs of new stores.)

Key Retailers in Singapore -sales per square feet versus suburban exposure


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## Structural difference in US and China Retail

China overtook US as the largest online retail market in 2013. According to National Bureau of Statistics, retail ecommerce sales in China stood at $10.6 \%$ of total retail sales in 2014. iResearch forecasts an e-commerce revenue CAGR of $27 \%$ over 2014-17 in China. However, the approach to online retail has been quite different in China compared to US In China, generally speaking, only a small portion of online sales is transacted directly between consumers and traditional retailers' own websites. Most of the online retailing in China occurs on virtual marketplaces such as Taobao and Tmall.

By contrast, in US and other developed markets, most of the online retailing occurs over the traditional retailers' own websites (such as Best Buy, Macy's etc) or online retailers (such as Amazon). In China, independent merchants/retailers account for less than $10 \%$ of total online sales as they have not developed strong online offerings and hence continue to rely on virtual marketplaces.

Virtual Marketplace versus Online retailer

|  | Virtual Marketplace <br> (Alibaba) | Online retailer <br> (JD.com's retail <br> business) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Means of <br> making <br> money | Earns from merchants <br> through online <br> marketing services, <br> commissions on <br> transactions, etc | Earns from consumers <br> through mark-up on <br> products sold |
| Gross <br> Margins | Superior margins as <br> inventory and logistics <br> costs are borne by the <br> merchants | Inferior margins due to <br> the inventory and <br> logistics costs |
| Product <br> Range | Generally large range <br> with products from <br> various retailers. Highly <br> scalable | Limited by product <br> sourcing capability and <br> inventory management. <br> May not be too scalable |
| After Sales | Operated by third-party <br> players | Well-established <br> customer services, fast <br> response to after-sales <br> queries |
| Product <br> Quality | Less control as third- <br> party <br> merchants could be <br> selling counterfeit <br> products | Strict quality check from <br> sourcing the products |

Source: DBS Bank

B2C ecommerce market share in China (2014)


* JD.com 's market share included e-commerce sales for Tencent, to be gradually absorbed by JD.com following their strategic cooperation in Mar 2014.
Source: iResearch
Amazon, for example, is essentially an online retailer with a small contribution from its marketplace where it sells products from various retailers. Alibaba, on the other hand, is a pure marketplace player selling products from third-party retailers. Alibaba derives the revenue from online marketing services and commissions on merchandises sold on its platform versus Amazon who mostly earns the mark-up from products sold to customers.

Online retailers need to maintain an inventory of the advertised products in its distribution centres which can be shipped to the final customer once the goods are sold. It can guarantee a certain level of customer service, delivery time and product quality. However, the added weight of maintaining inventory will increase the need for capital as well as increase operational overheads.

In contrast, the marketplace model allows for fewer overheads and eliminates the requirement of inventory and shipping. Some of the most successful marketplaces like Taobao and Tmall are inventory-light and do not bear inventory risks. However, this could lead to issues with product quality and shipping by vendors. With customer complaints, the marketplace player has little recourse other than contacting the vendor to identify and correct any issues.

Among other big markets in Asia, India is experiencing an acute shift to the marketplace model. At present, foreign players are not allowed to retail their own products while online market places do not face similar regulatory hurdles in India.

## Significance of O2O for traditional retailers

Online-to-offline commerce (O2O) is a means to direct online users to offline physical stores. With O2O, the customer can (i) buy products from the shop after online research; (ii) research and pay online, and collect the products from the shop to save delivery charges; and (iii) buy out-of-stock product in the shop by going online in the shop and ship to home.

Macy's, the largest department store operator in the US (in terms of sales), has seen a big improvement in online sales as well as same-store performance after introducing O 2 O retailing. Online sales have grown to $14 \%$ of total revenues from 4\% in 2011. The same-store sales have grown 1.9-5.3\% over the past three years while Macy's peers have seen it decline during the same period.

## Key Advantages of O2O

1) Higher impulse sales than online retailers. When a customer receives product delivery at home, he or she is unlikely to buy anything else. However, when one collects a product from the shop, he or she also comes across other products at the shop and is likely to buy other associated products.
2) Lower discounts than pure brick-and-mortar retailers. In brick-and-mortar retailing, a product which is difficult to sell in a particular store in the region is sold via heavy discounting. An O 2 O approach allows the retailer to sell the product to other stores in various regions at full price.
3) Better brand building than online retailers. Brick-andmortar stores in town centres and expensive malls provide high visibility and act as custodians of the brand.

## Key Challenges of O2O

Large investments are required to integrate in-store and online inventory of an entire retail chain. Secondly, retailers must build a nimble fleet of smaller vans carrying items from store to store on the same day. This is quite different from the conventional fleet of few large trucks. Overall, "click and collect" from the store is still cheaper than home deliveries.

## Retailers in China lag US retailers in ecommerce and 020

Most retailers in China including department stores, hypermarkets / supermarkets and the luxury segments still see limited or no contribution from e-commerce / O2O despite robust growth potentials. One key reason is that retailers have been too reliant on virtual marketplaces. There is also a lack of talents currently available in China to best implement ecommerce and O2O solutions. Some other obstacles could include the inadequate amount of merchandises suitable / available for online sales, especially in the case of department stores / shopping malls and grocery retail formats.

E-commerce as \% of retail sales in US and China in 2014


Source: Internet retailer, National Bureau of Statistics
E-commerce as \% of retails sales across key listed players in US and China


Source: Internet retailer, DBS Vickers
As shown in the charts above, e-commerce sales as a \% of overall retail sales is higher in China than in the US. However, proportionate ecommerce sales of department stores, cosmetics retailers and luxuries are much lower than their US peers. A major part of ecommerce sales in China still come from retail players or sole proprietors through third-party marketplace channels like T-mall and Taobao.

As for jewellery and watches, the US has high online sales as most of the online sales are done by traditional retailers' own websites. Besides, it is more popular for US customers to buy affordable jewelleries as festive gifts than in China, while these merchandises are usually more standardized and have lower ticket-sizes and could be more often transacted online.
\% of Online consumers buying various products (2013)


Source: CNNIC
While online spending mainly targets at the purchase of lowend products, the CNNIC survey states that in 2013, online buyers in China were the most active in the apparel \& footwear segment. Other more popular segments for ecommerce include digital (3C) products, as well as handbags \& luggage. On the other hand, demand for luxury items from ecommerce has been unnoticeable.

Retail stores in Tier-3 or lower-tier cities in China do not have well-developed retail infrastructure. As such, people in tier-3 cities go online to buy a wide range of products and brands which are unavailable locally. The E-commerce Index across top-100 cities in China reached 15.4 on average in 2013, which was ironically lower than the average of 17.4 across top-100 counties in China. By cross referencing the index level in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, the E-commerce Indexes of their capital cities (i.e. Nanjing and Hangzhou respectively) were also lower than selected counties in their regions. All these could suggest that the lower-tier cities have generally more active online customers, likely due to the lack of physical stores to offer an adequate variety of merchandise and offline shopping experience.

## 020 readiness checks

In this section, we try to compare various e-commerce and O2O initiatives including online sites, mobile apps, onlineoffline integration, and marketing strategies between some Chinese operators and selected overseas retailers. After making some analyses across department store operators which are mainly retail platform operators rather than brand owners, our findings suggest that China is significantly lagging behind in e-commerce \& O2O development. PRC retailers could take at least 1-2 years to more fully realise their O2O potential before benefitting from them.

## Battlefield 1: Company website / e-shop

Overall, major US department stores have made strategic investments in their websites to enhance content and increase conversion. For example, the following features are useful tools to simulate purchase in the US. Yet, generally speaking, these have so far been missing in most Chinese department stores that have already launched their online stores.

## i) Product video

Major US department stores have frequently been posting quality video clips onto their websites to feature their promotional products. These videos can generally boost consumer confidence on the products, leading to higher browse-buy conversion rates.

In China, none of the department stores have implemented this so far. In our view, the obstacles could include additional investments required on studios and content production team, limited number of products available online, etc.

## Nordstorm－user rating summary

## ＇RANIER＇LEATHER BOOTIE（WOMEN）

Write a Review｜ 7 reviews
Write a review for a chance to win a $\$ 1,000$ Nordstrom Gift Card See Official Rules．

Ratings summary
有 $\boldsymbol{C}$ 大夷奴 4.6 out of 5
$100 \%$ of reviewers recommended this product．

友夷夷战 3 review（s）
夷夷夷战败 0 review（s）

大效战故 0 review（s）

Narrow reviews by：Star Rating Fit

<br>Tho I really like this boot，the fit was good／true to size，and they were comfortable，I did not keep them．I tried them on with various skinny leg jeans，leggings，skirts，and dresses，and I＇m simply not a bootie girl！I prefer longer shafted boots and pumps．If you are

Source：Company，DBS Vickers
ii）User ratings and reviews
Major US department stores allow consumers to submit product ratings and reviews．These are important in our view as product quality and fit are among the main customer concerns especially for apparel and footwear products．In addition，most US online stores have social sharing and ＂recommendation to friend＂features to increase their customer base．Some even allow photo reviews and video reviews to enhance the richness of customer feedbacks．

In China，however，selected department stores such as Rainbow and New World Department Store offer these features，but user participation is generally low（no reviews for many products）．

## iii）Live chat with customer service

Live chat with customer service is available in some US department stores to enhance consumer confidence．This is not commonly implemented by Chinese department stores yet．

## iv）Search visibility

Overall，we view department stores＇search visibility（in popular search engines such as google，Baidu，etc．）as an important indicator of their brand awareness among online shoppers．In our view，this should be particularly important for Chinese department stores as many are on regional basis thus having a high search visibility would help to expand their customer base beyond their home markets．

In US and Europe，major department stores such as Saks，John Lewis，and Nordstorm have been using paid ads to increase their search visibility．We find that major players such as Nordstorm，Macy＇s and Sears generally appear on the front pages of search results for common keywords such as＂men shirt，＂ladies＇shoe＂，etc．

In China，however，search visibility is generally weak among department stores．We performed a series of searches on Baidu，China＇s most popular search engine，on common apparel keywords and virtually could not find any department store links on the search results．This indicates that department store operators in China need to implement an effective online marketing strategy to enhance their overall brand awareness among online shoppers．

## Battlefield 2：O2O integration

＂Click－and－collect＂gaining traction in US and Europe．．．In recent years，major US department stores such as Bloomingdale＇s and Macy＇s have added the＂click－and－collect＂ service，which allows consumers to order online and pick up in physical stores／kiosks．In addition，some department stores offer in－store return service and provide real－time inventory information to customers．
＂Click－and－collect＂has proven to be effective so far． According to a survey by UPS，about half of the online shoppers have chosen the＂click－and－collect＂service，while about 40\％make additional in－store purchases when they pick up the merchandises．

Prompted by the initial success，more US and European retailers are expanding their pick－up locations beyond their existing stores to enhance overall convenience to customers． For example，UK department store John Lewis has partnered with grocery store Waitrose to expand the number of pick－up locations to 300，against its own network of only 40 stores． Marks \＆Spencer is also partnering with Collect＋to leverage its network of 5，500＋pick－up points in the UK．

Waitrose＇s click－and－collect pick up lockers


Source：Company，DBS Vickers

## ．．．But still uncommon in China

Having said that，such＂click－and－collect＂business model remains uncommon in China，as O2O is still in an early development stage．Among major listed department stores in the PRC，an exception could be Rainbow（002419．CH），which has recently launched its＂click－and－collect＂service across about 400 pick－up points in Shenzhen，through partnerships with Catic Property（中航物业），GuoDa Drugstore（国大药房）， Sposter（速递易自提柜），ChangCheng Property（长城物业）， etc．

In our view，a successful implementation of＂click－and－collect＂ service in China could potentially boost department stores＇ online plus offline sales by mitigating customer concerns on the reliability of deliveries as well as lifting in－store traffic．After all，many major Chinese department stores mainly carry mid－ to higher－end ticket size items．

## Battlefield 3：Mobile Apps

## Functionality of mobile apps

In addition to e－commerce，department stores are also moving into the m －commerce space by launching their respective mobile apps．In the US and Europe，most major department stores including Sears，Macy＇s and Nordstrom have generally developed mobile apps in IOS／Android platforms．While in China，currently only a handful of operators such as Intime and Golden Eagle offer this．

We also find that mobile apps of the US and UK department stores generally offer more comprehensive functions than those offered by their Chinese peers．

For example，shoppers of most US department stores can use their mobile apps to view／write product ratings and reviews． In addition，operators like JC Penny and Nordstorm will show app users which products are available at stores within driving distance．

These functions are generally unavailable among major Chinese department stores．For example，Golden Eagle＇s mobile app currently only provides basic promotional information for its stores．No e－commerce or O2O functions have been implemented yet．Intime offers a more comprehensive mobile app with e－commerce function，but still lack useful features such as user reviews and inventory checks．

Sears' click-and-collect service


Source: Company, DBS Vickers

Mobile app function comparison

|  | Sears | Macys | Nordstrom | JC Penny | Intime | Golden Eagle |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Social sharing | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| E commerce | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| Wish list | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
| Geo-location | N | N | Y | Y | N | N |
| Rating and review | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N |
| Coupons | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Inventory check | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N |

Source: DBS Vickers

JCPenny provides comprehensive features in its mobile app


Source: DBS Vickers

## China Internet Market

E-commerce is the biggest portion of China internet sector revenue (2013)


Note: For e-commerce, we use revenue figures, instead of gross merchandise value (GMV).
Source: iResearch

## E -commerce is biggest component of China Internet sector.

The major sub-segments of the internet sector include ecommerce, online ads and online games. Despite its relatively small size, online payment and internet financing could see better growth prospects over the medium-term. We believe ecommerce has the best potential to achieve monetization (i.e. generating revenue and profit), supported by its transactionbased business model that closely involves payments and cash flows. Besides, online shoppers normally have clear intentions when they surf the internet, which helps to improve conversion rate (i.e. browse-buy ratio).

Eager to enhance their online influence, most brand operators are willing to partner with e-commerce players to tap on their online expertise. In addition, the use of mobile devices has increased users' time spent surfing the internet (to $>10$ hours a day), while users are also spending more on mobile commerce. Of note, c.30\% of online sales in China last year were transacted on mobile devices, versus c. $15 \%$ in 2013 (source: iResearch).

More netizens shopping online. Thanks to the promotion of computers and mobile devices, improvements in telecom facilities, and cultivation of online buying habits, the number of e-commerce customers in China had reached 302 m in 2013, and accounted for $49 \%$ of the total netizen population. This is still far below that in Japan (75\%), the US (76\%), and the UK (97\%). According to Aliresearch, e-commerce customers in China could sustain decent growth to reach c. 540 m in 2020F, and $>25 \mathrm{~m}$ new customers would start to buy online each year.

Online shoppers as \% of netizen population (2013)


Source: CNNIC, UK Statistics Bureau, A. T.Kearney, Statista.com
Online spending to grow rapidly. Based on iResearch data, we believe c.230m online shoppers had made their first online purchase since 2011. In other words, these customers have less than 4 years of online shopping experience, and they account for $\mathrm{c} .60 \%$ of total online shopper population in China. As such, we estimate that online shoppers in China have average 3.5 years of online shopping experience, and their average online spending was RMB7,153 last year (iResearch data).

Study on new online shoppers in China
\(\left.$$
\begin{array}{lrr}\text { Year } & \begin{array}{r}\text { Number of new } \\
\text { online shoppers }\end{array} & \begin{array}{r}\text { Online shopping } \\
\text { experience by now } \\
\text { (no. of years) }\end{array}
$$ <br>
2008 \& before \& 74 \& 7.5 <br>
2009 \& 34 \& 5.5 <br>
2010 \& 53 \& 4.5 <br>
2011 \& 33 <br>
2012 \& 48 <br>
2013 \& 60 <br>

2014 E \& 88\end{array}\right]\)| 3.5 |
| :--- |
| Average |

Source: iReserach, DBS Vickers
Studies by Aliresearch show that in the first year, online shoppers on average spend c.RMB1,000 per annum; by the fifth year, spending would rise to c.RMB15,000; by the tenth year, spending would reach c.RMB30,000. Since online shoppers in China on average have 3.5 years of online shopping experience, we believe there is plenty of upside potential for average online spending to grow. Aliresearch expects online spending per capita to reach c.RMB17,900 in 2020F, representing c.16\% CAGR over 2014E-2020F.

Spending per online shopper


Source：iReserach，Aliresearch，DBS Vickers
Rural e－commerce holds great potential．Despite sound e－ commerce developments over the years，online operators have mainly penetrated the urban markets so far，while rural areas have been largely untapped due to less－developed infrastructure and weak user awareness．In 2014，＞35\％of urban population in China had made online purchases，but only c． $10 \%$ of rural population had used e－commerce（source： Aliresearch）．

According to our estimates，online shoppers in rural areas on average spent c．RMB2，600 last year，or merely $1 / 3$ of the amount spent by their urban counterparts．Given rising income in the low－tier markets，we believe the gap could narrow over the medium－term．Aliresearch estimated that online sales in the rural markets amounted to RMB180bn last year．With improvements in payment channels and logistics facilities，rural online sales are expected to reach RMB460bn in 2016F， implying c． $60 \%$ CAGR．

Large potential in rural e－commerce，given low spending per capita

## 2014E

Online shopper population：

| $m$ | Urban | Rural | Total |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Population | 322 | 69 | 390 |
| Spending per online shopper： |  |  |  |
| RMB | Urban | Rural | Average |
| Spending | 8,118 | 2,628 | 7,153 |

## Key assumptions：

1）Rural e－commerce sales made c． $7 \%$ contribution
2）c． $10 \%$ of rural population shops online

In view of strong e－commerce potential in the rural markets， Alibaba Group plans to invest a total of RMB10bn within 3－5 years to enhance its rural exposure．Specifically，it aims to open c．1，000 rural operating centers and c．100，000 service stations in villages．This would allow the e－commerce giant to penetrate $1 / 3$ of the counties in China．JD．com has also been rolling out its rural service centers（＂京東幫服務店＂）since 2014，and aims to build c．2，000 service centers by 2017F．We believe expansion of the leading e－commerce operators could improve both infrastructure and customer awareness in the rural markets，helping to stimulate user demand ahead．

Rural e－commerce drives retail sales．Contrary to conventional belief，development of rural e－commerce in China has not been fully carried out at the expense of offline retail sales，in our view．Analysis by McKinsey shows that for every $¥ 1$ spent online in the rural markets，$¥ 0.57$ could be additional spending by the customers．This is mainly due to the lack of retail infrastructure in the rural areas，and online sales could actually encourage customers to spend more．Hence，with the evolution of rural e－commerce，we believe retail sales growth in China could be enhanced over the medium－term．

Development of online sales lifts total consumption


Note：E－commerce is more effective in stimulating retail sales in 3 rd \＆ 4th tier markets，as e－commerce offers greater convenience， promotion and social networking effects to rural users．
Source：McKinsey research（2013）
Mobile commerce on the way．Online shoppers in China are increasingly buying via their mobile devices，given longer time spent on mobile internet（＞10 hours a day），greater convenience of mobile commerce，and numerable O2O opportunities especially in group－buying and LBS（location－ based services，such as mobile maps）．Mobile commerce contributed c． $30 \%$ to e－commerce last year，and the ratio is expected to reach $57 \%$ in 2017F（source：iResearch）．

Market size of mobile commerce in China


Source：iResearch
In view of huge potential for mobile commerce，Alibaba Group had launched its first app，＂Mobile Taobao＂back in 2010. Riding on the success of Taobao marketplace and its first－ mover advantage，＂Mobile Taobao＂has been the most popular mobile commerce app in China by number of MAUs （monthly active users）since Aug 2012．Coupled with other apps such as Tmall，Juhuasuan（聚划算）and Taodiandian（淘點點），Alibaba had enjoyed the dominant position of c．86\％ mobile market share in 9M2014．

Despite its relatively small mobile market share，JD．com has increasingly gained traction in mobile commerce，thanks to the development of its online marketplace，improving payment channels，and user traffic support from Tencent following their strategic cooperations．Such initiatives lifted JD．com＇s mobile market share to $5.4 \%$ for 3Q14，as compared to merely $3.4 \%$ in 1Q14．

Alibaba leads in monetization．To sum up，we believe e－ commerce is well－positioned to monetize on user activities， and Alibaba could be the major beneficiary of this trend， followed by JD．com．Baidu has limited e－commerce exposure except for its investment in LEHO．com（愛樂活），an online sales platform focusing on fashion products．Tencent has transferred most of its e－commerce operations to JD．com， following their strategic cooperation since Mar 2014．Hence， Alibaba and JD．com could have better monetization potential， in our view．


Source：iResearch

## Last mile of marathon

E－commerce logistics：Way to grow．With e－commerce developing rapidly in China，product deliveries have achieved swift growth．China Post estimates that nearly 14bn parcels were delivered last year，representing c． $40 \%$ growth over 2013．Based on our estimates，c． $60 \%$ of these parcels could be related to e－commerce．Given the busy order flow，online shoppers are increasingly focusing on timeliness and accuracy of product deliveries，creating opportunities and challenges for e－commerce logistics．

According to government data and estimates by Global Logistics Properties（GLP），total GFA of logistics facilities in China amounts to c .550 m sq．m．，less than $1 / 3$ of GFA for logistics facilities in the US．Particularly，the GFA of modern logistics facilities in China is only c． 10 m sq．m．，and accounts for less than $2 \%$ of the portfolio．In terms of logistics area per capita，each online shopper shares a mere 1.4 sq．m．，versus 8.7 sq．m．in the US．Hence，GLP expects decent growth in China＇s logistics sector，and total GFA of logistics facilities could reach 2．4bn sq．m．by 2029F（implying c．10\％growth per annum）．

Alibaba adopts the asset－light approach．China Smart Logistics （＂Cainiao 菜鳥＂，48\％held by Alibaba Group）has been developing a smart logistics IT system．In this system，China Smart Logistics utilizes its＂big data＂analytic capability to process customer orders to come up with optimized delivery routes，and logistics partners such as S．F．Express（順豐速運） and EMS provide the deliveries．China Smart Logistics also secured lands in key locations（e．g．Hangzhou，Guangzhou， Wuhan，Chengdu，Beijing and Tianjin），to develop logistics hubs for its network．As of June 2014，China Smart Logistics has the capability to deliver c .17 m parcels per day；the ultimate goal is to deliver $>100 \mathrm{~m}$ parcels daily，which would reach the buyers within 24 hours of order placement．


Source：Companies

Comparison of logistics sector development between China and the US（2014E）


Source：Government websites，GLP，CEIC

JD．com pursues own logistics model．Aiming to offer timely and accurate deliveries to customers，JD．com has been operating own fulfillment infrastructure（i．e．warehousing and delivery facilities）since 2007．As of Sep 2014，JD．com operated 118 warehouses（total GFA of c．2．3m sq．m．），2，045 delivery stations and 1,045 pickup stations across 1,855 counties and districts．

Besides，the company has been constructing highly－automated warehouses，＂Asia No． 1 （亞洲一號）＂，in key locations．The first ＂Asia No．1＂warehouse in Shanghai was launched in Oct 2014，with c． 100,000 sq．m．of GFA（the 1st phase）．It has also started to build＂Asia No．1＂warehouses in Guangzhou， Wuhan and Shenyang，to be launched this year．There are plans for more＂Asia No．1＂warehouses in Beijing，Chengdu and Xi＇an，to improve JD．com＇s logistics capability．

Comparison of logistics areas（2014E）


Note：Alibaba Group rides on logistics capability of its strategic delivery partners．Its China Smart Logistics（＂Cainiao＂）has secured several locations in China to develop key distribution centers．
Source：Companies，DBS Bank，DBS Vickers

## ASEAN E-commerce Market

Online sales are low in ASEAN versus China. According to research firm, Euromonitor, online retailing accounted for less than $1 \%$ of total retail sales in the six largest Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). This compares to $6-10 \%$ in China, US and Europe, with China leading the pack due to the success of its online marketplace model pioneered by Alibaba.

Indonesia overtook Singapore and Thailand in 2014 to emerge as the largest e-commerce market in ASEAN with online sales of US $\$ 1.1 \mathrm{bn}$. This translated into only $0.7 \%$ of the total sales in Indonesia as per Euromonitor who forecasts online revenue CAGR of 38\% over 2014-17.

Thailand had online sales of US $\$ 1.1$ bn in 2014 only slightly behind Indonesia. This translated to $1.2 \%$ of the total sales as per Euromonitor who forecasts online revenue CAGR of 19\% over 2014-17

Singapore is the third largest market with online retail sales of US $\$ 860 \mathrm{~m}$ or $3.4 \%$ of total retail sales as per Euromonitor, who forecasts a $13 \%$ CAGR for online retail revenue over 2014-17. Despite much higher income levels, Singapore's online sales lag behind developed countries due to the convenience of well-developed retail outlets all over the island and the lack of strong domestic e-commerce players. A majority of online sales are skewed towards the products which are not available locally.

Malaysia had online retail sales of US\$496m or $0.9 \%$ of the total sales as per Euromonitor, who forecasts a $21 \%$ CAGR for online retail revenue over 2014-17.

## ASEAN Internet retailing as a \% of total retail sales



Source: Euromonitor 2014

## Payment, Delivery and Marketing are three key challenges in

 ASEAN.1) There is a lack of trust in online retailers in terms of product reliability and safety of the payment mechanism. Credit card ownership covers less than $10 \%$ of the population
and those who possess credit cards do not use them online for fear of fraud. Most customers prefer cash-on-delivery (COD) which requires sophisticated delivery partners.
2) With the exception of Singapore, delivery network is a big challenge in ASEAN. Postal services are often unreliable and local logistics firms are still unused to handling high volumes of small packages.
3) Online marketing is trickier in ASEAN than in the US or China, due to varied cultures, languages and regulations. Online players need to customise their online portals to suit local languages and cultures while battling various customs rules.

Couple of deals above US\$100m took place in 2014. In June 2014, Alibaba bought a 10\% stake in Singapore Post for US $\$ 250 \mathrm{~m}$, signalling its intention to grow faster in ASEAN. In Oct 2014, Indonesia's leading e-commerce marketplace, PT Tokopedia, raised US\$100m from Japanese investment firm SoftBank Corp. and Sequoia Capital. Lazada, the Rocket Internet-backed e-commerce firm, received fresh funding of US $\$ 250 \mathrm{~m}$ in Dec 2014, led by Singapore's Temasek Holdings. Besides Lazada (multi-category), Rocket Internet has another online store Zalora (apparels) in the region. Japan's biggest marketplace Rakuten set up its Southeast Asian headquarters in Singapore in 2013 and is keen to be a regional player.

2014 saw the entry of Internet messaging players into ecommerce. Japanese Internet voice and messaging provider LINE entered the e-commerce fray in 2014 in Thailand with the launch of its online marketplace. For now, it will only be available in Thailand, where LINE has 33m active users. LINE partners with a local e-commerce service provider called aCommerce, which takes care of product sourcing, storage and delivery. Last year its rival WeChat ( $\sim 480 \mathrm{~m}$ users) launched e-commerce and food delivery services too. There have also been rumours of Twitter entering the e-commerce market as well where it may provide an online platform for retailers to sell their products.

In March 2014, WeChat's parent Tencent bought a 15\% stake in JD, China's second largest e-commerce company, giving JD an exclusive shopping channel on the WeChat platform. WeChat then launched its first takeaway delivery service in December by partnering with Foodpanda. KakaoTalk, which has 50 m users mainly across South Korea, also has plans to get into e-commerce by challenging Coupang, the so-called "Amazon of South Korea". Each are taking advantage of instant access to millions of users, while avoiding the expensive process of building an e-commerce infrastructure from scratch.

## Singapore - Rising labour costs and stagnant tourist numbers to accelerate e-commerce

Singapore's internet penetration, smartphone adoption, financial infrastructure and logistical facilities, are among the best in the world. Despite this, Singapore has not seen similar online retail adoption rates as certain developed countries such as Japan and South Korea due to high convenience of shopping in nearby malls and tourist spending and the absence of a strong local e-commerce player. A large portion of online sales comes from players outside Singapore.
According to AT Kearney $\sim 47 \%$ of all online retail sales in Singapore comes from outside the ASEAN region. As a result, a big cross section of online sales tend to have considerably high shipping costs and long delivery times. However, we think that online retail adoption could accelerate over the next three years due to the following reasons.

Tourist arrival numbers have not been increasing
Singapore attracted over 15 m tourists in 2014 who tend to play a significant role in the retail segment. Retail sales generated from these tourists and travellers tend to be comparatively more resilient to changes brought on by online shopping, as it is a part of the holiday experience for them. However, tourist numbers have not been increasing, resulting in a lower percentage of retail sales from tourist spending. Retail brands have also expanded into other markets in China, Indonesia and Malaysia, making Singapore a less unique shopping destination.
\% of retail sales coming from tourist spending Singapore


Source: DBS Bank

## Retailers are hard hit by labour policy changes

The services sector (including the retail industry) has been most impacted by the Singapore government's reduction of the Dependency Ratio Ceiling (DRC) - which determines the number of foreign workers a firm is permitted to hire based on the number of local staff it has. Retailers in Singapore collectively face two problems: first, escalating labour costs which impinge on their profitability; and second, even if retailers are able to contain their labour costs and afford additional labour, there isn't any labour to be found.

Unit labour cost of the economy (4Q rolling avg)


Source: Singstat, CEIC, DBS Bank

## Suburban retailers may steal market share from downtown retailers

There is likely to be an impact coming from the emergence of regional centres - Jurong in the Western part of Singapore, Tampines in the East and Woodlands in the North. These master-planned centres brought shopping to the heartlands as regional malls offer shopping experiences that were previously only available downtown.

Convenience factor favours suburban retailers over downtown counterparts
Singapore offers the super convenience of shopping malls within short distances from homes. Except for lifestyle needs and high-end products, consumers prefer to shop for groceries, garments and cosmetics, etc. from their neighbourhood malls. As such, malls that offer low- to mid-end products are likely to face higher substitution from online sales, in our view.

TechinAsia's popular e-commerce sites in SG

| Name | Products sold | Started |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Reebonz | Luxury goods | 2009 |
| Kwerkee | Novelty design <br> accessories | 2012 |
| Qoo10 | B2C General <br> marketplace | 2012 |
| RedMart | Household <br> items/groceries | 2011 |
| Luxola | Cosmetics/beauty <br> products | 2011 |
| NoQ Store | Books | 2011 |
| HipVan | Home \& furnishings, <br> accessories, art, fashion | 2013 |
| Bellabox | Beauty products | 2011 |
| Clozette | Fashion | 2010 |
| Rakuten | B2C General <br> marketplace | 2014 |
| Taobao | B2C General <br> marketplace | 2013 |
| Zalora | Fashion | 2012 |
| Carousell | C2C 2nd hand <br> marketplace | 2012 |
| Wego | Travel | 2005 |
| VanityTrove | Beauty products | 2011 |

Source: TechinAsia. com, DBS Bank

Most popular categories in Singapore include travel, fashion and beauty, and electronics, while the least popular tend to be categories such as financial products and services, food, groceries, etc. according to flipit, an online couponing company.

## Emergence of strong e-commerce players

However, more and more local players and local affiliates of larger global e-commerce platforms are emerging in Singapore. Global players like Alibaba have invested in Singpost, which is developing a logistical hub in Singapore. This should cut down the costs as well as the delivery times for local customers, leading to better adoption.

Luxola, a Singapore-based online cosmetics retailer, said it hit its first $\$ \$ 1 \mathrm{~m}$ in sales in two years of its April 2011 launch. But its most recent million-dollar revenue was achieved in under two months in April 2014, according to its founder and chief executive, Alexis Horowitz-Burdick, who expects annual revenue to hit $\$ \$ 100 \mathrm{~m}$ by 2016.

Even e-marketplaces that represent individual sellers and retail entrepreneurs claim to be going great guns. Singapore-based Qoo10, for one, said transaction volume on its site grew from under $\mathbf{S} \$ 100 \mathrm{~m}$ in 2012 to $\$ \$ 150 \mathrm{~m}$ in 2013 and it expects this to double to S\$300 million in 2014. In Feb 2014, Japanese emarketplace giant Rakuten launched its Singapore website to connect more individual buyers and sellers. Rakuten has also partnered Toys 'R' Us to sell the latter's goods on its website. Like Toys 'R' Us, local brick-and-mortar store Planet Telecoms has also entered the e-commerce fray.

## Indonesia - Lack of Trust and Logistics Bottleneck

Indonesia overtook Singapore and Thailand in 2014 to emerge as the largest e-commerce market in ASEAN with online sales of US $\$ 1.1 \mathrm{bn}$. This translated into only $0.7 \%$ of the total sales in Indonesia as per Euromonitor who forecasts online revenue CAGR of $38 \%$ over 2014-17. Within online retail sales, entertainment media (books, video games etc.), consumer electronics and fashion have been enjoying significant interest. In addition, travel-related sites have also been seeing a fair interest.

Leading online retailers in Indonesia

| Company | Category |
| :--- | :--- |
| Kaskus | Misc |
| TokoBagus | Misc |
| Berniaga | Misc |
| Lazada Indonesia | Misc |
| Bhinneka | Consumer electronics |
| Agoda.com | Travel |
| Zalora | Fashion |
| Tiket | Travel |
| Groupon Indonesia | Misc, Lifestyle |
| Tokopedia | Misc, Mostly consumer electronics |
| Bukalapak | Misc, Mostly consumer electronics |
| Qoo10 Indonesia | Misc |
| Elevenia | Misc |
| Lamido Indonesia | Misc |
| Rakuten Belanja Online | Misc |

Source: DBS Vickers

## Couple of deep-pocketed players

Lazada and Tokopedia are the top marketplaces in Indonesia. As its fifth anniversary in October 2014, Tokopedia claimed that its merchants were selling about 2 m products a month. It also reportedly received 10 m visitors a month. In Feb 2015, Lippo Group launched MatahariMall, a new e-commerce venture, in partnership with the Matahari chain of department stores.

## Key Challenges

Online retail is hampered by trust and image issues in Indonesia. According to a study by McKinsey \& Company, key customer concerns include fraudulent image of online retail, issues with online payments and issues with reliability of product quality have been ranked high. As a result those companies that look to address these issues may see better growth in online retail in the medium term. For example, Zolara Indonesia has introduced free shipping with no minimum spend, money back guarantees, cash-on-delivery payments and providing mobile platforms to address these issues. The lack of developed logistical infrastructure is another key issue.

## Online sales are highly concentrated around Jakarta

 Much of the e-commerce activity is centred around Jakarta as the city has one of the highest internet penetration levels ( $\sim 43 \%$ ) in the country ( $\sim 32 \%$ ), mainly from people using 3G phones. Coupled with its size, approximately 30 m people in Greater Jakarta ( $\sim 12 \%$ of the country's population), this offers a large potential market for e-commerce players, which other areas of Indonesia cannot offer. JNE, the market leader in ecommerce logistics in Indonesia, delivers c. $60 \%$ of its ecommerce related packages within Jakarta.Key reasons for not shopping in Indonesia (top 3 reasons \%)


Source: McKinsey and Company, Evolving Indonesian Consumer, Nov 2013

Internet User Penetration in Java and Bali Regions


Source: Indonesia Internet Usage for Business Sector - 2013, Indonesia Internet Service Provider Association

For example, a study conducted by UNICEF, Indonesia's ICT ministry, the Berkman Centre for Internet and Society, and Harvard University on internet activity on teenagers has found out that most of Indonesia's 30 m teen internet users reside in urban areas like Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Banten. About 87\%
of teens who live in rural areas have never accessed the web. In addition, as a large nation spread across several islands with under-developed infrastructure, e-commerce players face difficulties in reaching the more remote locations.

## Thailand - Traditional Retailers are Proactive

Thailand had online sales of US\$1.1bn in 2014, only slightly behind Indonesia. This translated into $1.2 \%$ of the total sales as per Euromonitor who forecasts an online revenue CAGR of 19\% over 2014-17.

## Traditional retailers are active in the online space

At present, internet retailing in Thailand remains fragmented with many small online websites. Major brick-and-mortar chains that have developed online platforms are also among them. For example, Tesco Lotus started an online shopping mall in Thailand back in 2013. They offer over 20,000 products for home delivery. Big C and Tops also have online platforms targeting urban clientele. CP ALL, the 7-Eleven franchisee in Thailand, is using its nationwide network of more than 8,000 stores to allow online retailers to do self-collection and in-store payments.

Notable online retail players

| Company | Category |
| :--- | :--- |
| Lazada | Misc |
| WeLoveShopping | Misc |
| Tarad | Misc |
| Zalora | Fashion |
| Ensogo | Misc |
| Agoda | Travel |
| Air Asia | Air Line Ticketing |
| Bookings.com | Hotel Booking |
| Cdiscount | Misc |
| J.I.B | Consumer Electronics |
| Central.co.th | Misc |
| Munkonggadget | Consumer Electronics |
| eBay | Misc |

## Source: DBS Vickers

Japanese Internet voice and messaging provider LINE entered the e-commerce fray in 2014 in Thailand with the launch of its online marketplace. For now, it will only be available in Thailand, where LINE has 33 m active users. LINE partners with a local e-commerce service provider called aCommerce, which takes care of product sourcing, storage and delivery. Last year, its rival WeChat ( $\sim 480 \mathrm{~m}$ users) launched e-commerce and food delivery services too.

Lazada.com, which operates in the ASEAN region, has allocated US $\$ 30 \mathrm{~m}$ reportedly on their marketing budget on Thailand in 2014, while sales are expected reach US $\$ 50 \mathrm{~m}$ in 2014. Lazada Thailand claims to have an average of 5 m users per month with a bounce rate of $40 \%$. Furthermore, $30 \%$ of the traffic comes from referrals.

Luxoda is an online beauty store with operations in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Brunei. Out of its 450,000 visitors per month, $\sim 36,000$ are estimated to be from Thailand.
Weloveshopping.com is an example of a C2C transaction platform in Thailand that uses a third-party payment processor provided by True Money, an online wallet service in the country. They also hold customers' payments for seven days before releasing them to merchants, within which the buyers can claim for a refund.

## Key Challenges

Intense competition from traditional retailers, who are expanding aggressively, is seen as a major threat to online retail's growth. Similarly, high-end department stores are seeing significant growth. The newer shopping complexes in Bangkok's central region are moving towards the high-end, luxury-style shopping segment. This segment is more resilient to the disruption caused by online retail due to their exclusivity.

Similar to Indonesia, lack of trust also serves as a major deterrence in Thailand's online retail market. The majority of online shoppers (62\%) in Thailand are reluctant to give out credit card information while online. Further, suitable security measures in this area are still lacking.

Logistics also play a role. Free delivery of goods in e-commerce was limited to only $25 \%$ of buyers in 2013. While the national postal service is considered cheap, delivery remains unreliable. Many private logistics operators cover only selected areas and tend to be expensive.

Low internet penetration level is also seen as being another key bottleneck for Thailand. Despite much higher income levels, smartphone penetration in Thailand is only $40 \%$ versus $25-30 \%$ in Indonesia.

## Malaysia - Cyber Security Issues

Malaysia had online retail sales of US\$496m or 0.9\% of the total sales as per Euromonitor, who forecasts a $21 \%$ CAGR for online retail revenue over 2014-17. Malaysia also sees a similar product distribution pattern when it comes to the popularity
of online retail. Travel is a clear leader in terms of online purchases while entertainment media, consumer electronics and fashion tend to enjoy high interest as well.

Intent to purchase in the next 6 months - Malaysia online consumers - 2014


Source: Nielsen Global Survey of e-commerce, Q1 2014

Leading online retailers in Malaysia

| Company | Category |
| :--- | :--- |
| Lelong.my | Fashion |
| Lazada | Misc, Mostly consumer electronics |
| Groupon | Misc, Lifestyle |
| Zalora | Fashion |
| eBay | Misc |
| Rakuten | Misc |
| Qoo10 | Misc |
| Lamido | Misc |
| Youbeli | Misc, Mostly consumer electronics |
| Mudah.my | Misc |
| ShaShinKi | Consumer electronics |
| Fashion Valet | Fashion |
| ASOS | Fashion |
| Shopbop.com | Fashion |
| Book Depository | Books |

Source: DBS Vickers

Lelong.my is the online marketplace leader in Malaysia, with Lazada closing in. Lelong.my was estimated to have had 5 m visits in November 2014 versus 3.8m for Lazada. Groupon and eBay are among the popular marketplaces too. Zalora is one of the most popular online retailers in Malaysia. In addition. Malaysia has also attracted other major international players such as Zappos and Amazon over the past few years.

## Key Challenges

Malaysia has a number of positive factors contributing towards online retail. It has high internet and smartphone penetration levels as well as heavy credit card usage (1.1 cards per household). In addition, the country has a good transportation infrastructure facilitating better delivery services. However, the online retail segment has a relatively small footprint ( $<1 \%$ share).

According to A.T. Kearney, the main challenges to Malaysia's e-commerce growth has been cyber security issues and certain consumer behaviours that drive them to physically inspect the goods. In order to reduce fraud, the government introduced new legislation in 2013, which included regulations and fines. Though these were seen as positive for consumer protection, some industry observers highlighted the possibility of prohibitive costs for retailers. On consumer behaviour, we believe these patterns are likely to change in the long term as online retailers develop ways to improve consumer experiences and as consumers become more familiar with online retail.

## The Philippines - Foreign Players take the lead

The online retail market in the Philippines accounts for less than $3 \%$ of the 100 m population in the country, according to Philippine Retailers Association (PRA). Further, only 2.5 m credits cards are in use. Despite this, online retail recorded an $11 \%$ growth in 2012, according to Euromonitor International.

It has been further revealed by Euromonitor that around 40\% of the local internet retailing is fragmented and shared by small players in the market. As per big players, Amazon takes the lead, due to its trusted security and its extensive range of products. Filipinos use Amazon as a method to import goods.

Top 5 Retail Sites in the Philippines in 2013

| Site | Unique Visitors (000) |
| :--- | :--- |
| Amazon Sites | 1,094 |
| Apple.com Worldwide sites | 730 |
| AVG.com | 693 |
| Lazada Sites | 628 |
| MULTIPLY.com | 515 |

Source: ComScore, Inc. 2013

Considering the categories which are retailed online the most, electronics and electrical goods lead the market share followed by food and groceries, according to iCD Research. Another point to note is that Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) is very popular in the Philippines with its over 400,000 workforce. These workers are on duty at odd hours and tend to order food and groceries from convenience stores with online operations such as Philippine Seven (7-eleven in Philippines). Traditional shopping malls are closed during these times while such convenience stores operate 24/7.

Major Online Retail Categories - Expected Sales Figures for 2015


Over 10 m migrant Filipinos work abroad, and that has created a new market of buying online from overseas and delivering within the country. This trend has led to more online retail sites opening in the Philippines to tap local markets. A case in point is Island Rose, one of the largest flower retailers and wholesalers in the Philippines, which opened an e-commerce site in 2000. This online retail shop allows consumers from all over the world purchase gifts and have them delivered to their loved ones anywhere in the Philippines.

With the increase in popularity of online retail, SM investment group, owner of one of the largest shopping malls in the country, has announced its scheduled commencement of operations online.

## Key Challenges

The main challenge to online retail is still the adverse popularity of credit cards and issues related to trust. Many online retailers have offered cash-on-delivery option to overcome this, even though this is relatively costly. Further, the setting up and secure maintenance of an online facility seems to be a big step for Filipino retailers. Our previous example, Island Rose, overcame this challenge by using third party cloud software-as-a-service solutions from San Mateo, Californiabased NetSuite. Another challenge online retailers have to face in the Philippines is the higher logistic charges to ship among islands. According to Filipino 7-eleven CEO, it is cheaper to have distribution centres in each island than to ship from a central location.

List of E-commerce Retailers in Philippines

| Site | Category |
| :--- | :--- |
| Amazon | Misc |
| Lazada Philippines | Misc |
| Kimstore | Consumer Electronics |
| Zalora Philippines | Fashion |
| OLX | Misc, P2P |
| Shop This Easy | Fashion |
| Philippine Seven | Misc |
| Ayos Dito | Misc |
| Goods.ph | Misc |
| Widget City | Widget City |
| Metro Mall | Misc |
| Keekay.ph | Cosmetics |

Source: DBS Vickers

Source: iCD Research

## Company Discussion

## Our assessment on key retail segments

Following our discussions, we have come to conclude that:
i) Retail platform operators could compete more directly with e-platform plays, given that both of them mainly offer customer reach. The former could include department stores, shopping malls, home appliance retailers, hypermarkets and supermarkets, and it could be worthwhile to hasten their e-commerce \& O2O development. Alternatively, brand operators could be complementary to either or both physical retail chains and e-platforms as they have their own product offerings.
ii) Operators that are positioned in the lower-end and massmarket segments could face stronger rivalry from pure online plays than luxury groups. Product categories including apparel \& footwear and electronic \& 3C products could be more prone to competition from online players. Handbag \& luggage, cosmetics, home appliances and food products could also see some competition from pure e-commerce operators, while luxury goods (e.g. jewellery, luxury watches, global premium brands) could be less affected in terms of direct competition.

## Disruption to be higher in China than in ASEAN

E-commerce sales account for $\sim 10 \%$ of retail sales in China in 2014 versus only $\sim 1 \%$ in ASEAN. Retailers, especially retail platform operators in China could see more threats from ecommerce. We expect a gradual loss of market share to online players in Singapore as rising labour costs make traditional retailers less competitive. The potential threat from online sales is still low in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, but we like retailers who are using online as an additional channel to increase sales. Retailers with relatively lower sales per square foot such as department stores and cosmetic retailers are likely to see disruption ahead. Meanwhile, retailers selling lifestyle and luxury products may be more resilient on the whole

## Companies in China/HK

Retail stores in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities in China do not have well-developed retail infrastructure. As such, people in Tier-3 cities use e-commerce to buy a wide range of products and brands which are unavailable locally.

Key Retailers in China - Sales per square feet versus percentage of stores in tier-1 cities


Source: DBS Vickers (Note: The chart focuses to gauge operating landscape with respect to online development in China. Hypermarket / supermarket players could face other challenges a bit more, particularly related to the swift increase in staff costs and start-up costs of new stores.)

The optimal strategy is to go online and increase sales psf / year. For selected China-based retailers, we plotted sales, sales area and existing footprint in Tier-1 cities in the chart above. The bubble size is a function of retail revenue. On a simplistic two dimensional basis of sales per square foot (psf) and footprint, we think companies with low sales psf should aim to move upwards in this chart by going online to increase sales psf.

Who are challenged? Many of the department stores have big presence in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities where consumers prefer to shop online for much better range and pricing. Thus, they need to speed up in O2O solutions.

Key Retailers in China - details on e-commerce sales, sales per square feet and store network

| Company | Sector | E- <br> commerce <br> sales estimates \% (2014E) | RMB Sales psf/ yr | $\begin{array}{r} \hline \text { Sales -GSP } \\ \text { (RMBm) } \end{array}$ | \% non-tier one cities | Store count |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Golden Eagle | Department store | Insignificant | 1,080 | 15,841 | 83\% | 27 |
| Intime | Department store | 10\% | 592 | 15,814 | 79\% | 44 |
| Parkson | Department store | Insignificant | 712 | 16,742 | 64\% | 60 |
| NW <br> Department <br> Store | Department store | Insignificant | 762 | 12,462 | 26\% | 43 |
| Springland Department store | Department store | N.A | 1,146 | 8,262 | 96\% | 18 |
| Springland Supermarket | Hypermarket/supe rmarket | N.A | 807 | 2,787 | 96\% | 32 |
| Sunart | Hypermarket/supe rmarket | Insignificant | 830 | 91,855 | 72\% | 372 |
| Beijing JKL | Hypermarket/supe rmarket | Insignificant | 1,227 | 4,611 | 0\% | 287 |
| Wumart | Hypermarket/supe rmarket | N.A | 2,259 | 21,636 | 4\% | 565 |

Source: Companies, DBS Vickers

Who are most resilient? Jewellery retailers such as Chow Tai Fook (1929 HK), Chow Sang Sang (116 HK) and Luk Fook (590 HK ) may be more resilient as consumers may not want to buy such expensive products online. Store operators are keen to invite them into their stores as these 3 jewellery retailers have
built their name in China. FYI, Chow Tai Fook is currently the leading jewellery retailer in the PRC, while Chow Sang Sang and Luk Fook are also among the top 10. We also have sales per sq feet data available for these players

Jewellery Retailers in China－details on e－commerce sales，estimated sales per square feet and store network

|  | Company | Sector | E－commerce <br> sales estimates <br> $\%(2014 E)$ | HK\＄Sales <br> psf／yr | Sales－GSP <br> （HK\＄m） | \％non－tier <br> one cities | Store count <br> China |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chow Tai Fook | Jewellery Retail | $<1 \%$ | 73,099 | 58,640 | $77 \%$ | 2,292 |  |
| China | Chow Sang <br> Sang | Jewellery Retail | $2 \%$ | 79,201 | 19,246 | $64 \%$ | 405 |
| China | Luk Fook | Jewellery Retail | $<1 \%$ | 28,668 | 6,536 | $78 \%$ | 1,442 |

Source：DBS Vickers（Note：A majority of Luk Fook＇s stores in China are licensed stores so that only wholesale revenue for these stores have been included in the calculation．）

## Ranking of the Internet Players in China

The medium－term winners．We have ranked major online players－Alibaba Group，Tencent，JD．com and Baidu－ according to their capabilities in monetization，payments， logistics and Offline to Online（O2O）．Particularly，we believe functions that could play important roles in O 2 O include group buying，mobile maps，and online advertising solutions that help offline players increase sales．In our view，Alibaba and JD．com score better in monetization potential thanks to their e－ commerce exposure；Alipay（related party of Alibaba Group）is well－poised to lead in the burgeoning online payment industry， followed by Tencent＇s social network－based payment solutions； Alibaba and JD．com stand out in logistics，thanks to Alibaba＇s development of smart logistics IT system and JD．com＇s self－ operated logistics model；Baidu and Tencent could fare better in O 2 O development，aided by their initiatives in mobile maps and performance－based advertising solutions for offline store operators．

DBSV ranking system for Internet Players in China

|  | Baidu | Alibaba | Tencent | JD．com |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Monetization potential | 大 $大$ 大 | 大 大 大 大 | 大 大 $大$ | 大入大入 |
| Payment capability | 大 $\star$ | ＊大 大 大 $\boldsymbol{*}$ | $\star \star \star$ | 大 $\star$ |
| Logistics development | － | ＊大 大 大 大 | $\star$ | ＊$大$ 大 $大$＊ |
| 020 potential | 大 $大$ 大 $\boldsymbol{*}$ 大 | 大 $大$ 大 |  | 大 $大$ |
| TOTAL | 大 大 |  | 大 $大$ 大 | 大 大 |

Source：DBS Vickers
Overall，Alibaba scores the best in our ranking system（4．5 stars），and we believe it is well－positioned to become the medium－term winner in China＇s online space．

JD．com is ranked second（ 3.25 stars），thanks to its steady growth of direct sales and emerging contributions from its online marketplace．Besides，its delivery capability could be further improved by the ramp－up of logistics facilities，especially the＂Asia No．1＂automated warehouses．In Dec 2014，Tencent raised its investment in JD．com by US $\$ 150 \mathrm{~m}$ at US $\$ 23.8$ per ADS

Despite relatively smaller potential from the monetization of online games，Tencent（3 stars）could leverage on a large base of $>540 \mathrm{~m}$ mobile users on its Mobile QQ and Weixin platforms， and create greater synergies in the social network ecosystem． Growth could be driven by better utilization of performance－ based ads，including ads on Qzone and Weixin＂Public Account＂，as well as its latest launch of Weixin＂Moments＂ads． Its payment channels could also increase medium－term contributions to the ecosystem．

As for Baidu（ 2.5 stars），we believe its monetization of online ads could face greater challenge from Tencent＇s performance－ based ads．Baidu Wallet could also lag behind Alipay and Tenpay in payment applications，which could affect Baidu＇s medium－term growth prospects．Hence，we remain relatively cautious of Baidu＇s business outlook．

## Companies in Singapore

A different set of rules apply in Singapore due to its well－ developed retail infrastructure．Suburban locations in Singapore provide most of the popular products and brands． These shops also provide big convenience of shopping near the homes and instant gratification versus waiting for the e－ commerce delivery．Suburban shops also benefit from lower rental expenses compared to city－centre shops．In our view， ＂winners＂should be companies with high sales per square foot（psf）and high suburban footprint．


Source: Euromonitor, Companies, DBS Bank

Key Retailers in Singapore - details on e-commerce sales, sales per square feet and sub-urban exposure

| Company | Sector | E-commerce sales estimates \% (2014E) | Remarks | S\$ Sales psf/ yr | $\begin{gathered} \text { Sales } \\ (\mathrm{S} \$ \mathrm{~m}) \end{gathered}$ | \% Suburban | Store count |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sheng Siong | Supermarkets | Est. to be $<2 \%$ | Started online shopping serving vicinity around current store areas, with plans to expand and scale up coverage eventually. | 1,797 | 726 | 89\% | 35 |
| OSIM | Personal Goods | Insignificant | OSIM is in the business of marketing, distributing and franchising of a comprehensive range of healthy lifestyle products. | 2,928 | 85 | 66\% | 29 |
| Courts Asia | Home appliances | Not available | Electrical, IT and furniture retailer offering affordable products in SEA. Offers online shopping service and delivery. | 1,319 | 541 | 79\% | 14 |
| Epi Centre | Electrical \& Electronic | Not available | Undergoing RTO. Online presence on epilife. | 10,301 | 177 | 14\% | 7 |
| Challenger | Electrical \& Electronic | Not available | Regional IT retailer with strong product partnerships with major global brands. Offers O 2 O service. | 2,939 | 402 | 72\% | 32 |
| FJ Benjamin | Fashion apparels, watches | Not available | Industry leader in retail and distribution networks for international luxury and lifestyle brands across Asia. | 598 | 52.8 | 20\% | 40 |
| Hour Glass | Luxury watches | 0\% | Asia's premier luxury watch retailer. | 17,268 | 297 | 0\% | 8 |
| Cortina Watch | Luxury watches | 0\% | Retail and distribution of luxury watches to the domestic market as well as foreign markets such as China, HK, India, Japan, Korea, Middle East, Russia, SEA and Taiwan. | 10,122 | 218 | 0\% | 9 |
| Metro | Department store | Not available | Online shopping service available on Metro Online, Metro's ecommerce platform. Provides complimentary door to door delivery within Singapore with min purchase of $\$ 80$ nett on Metro Online, or \$5 if below. | 768 | 128 | 60\% | 5 |

[^1]The optimal strategy is to go online and increase sales psf / year. For selected Singapore retailers, we plotted sales, sales area and existing physical footprint in urban areas in the chart above. The bubble size is a function of retail revenue. On a simplistic two dimensional basis of sales per square foot (psf) and physical urban footprint, we think companies with low sales psf should aim to move upwards in this chart by going online to increase sales psf.

Who are more resilient? We have identified key players under the "resilient" quadrant such as luxury watch companies, Hour Glass and Cortina Watch. Their sales are less likely to be cannibalised by pure e-commerce players while higher rental expenses can be supported by high sales psf. Arguably, "survivors" such as Sheng Siong can actively sustain low sales psf with lower rental expenses and closer proximity to customers through their extensive footprint in suburban areas. Plus Sheng Siong has a significant contribution coming from Fresh food, which is unlikely to go online.

What about the challenged? FJ Benjamin is a "challenged" example, with low sales psf / year and high urban footprint. To justify costly rental expenses, these companies need to have large sales contribution from online channels in addition to revenue from brick-and-mortar outlets. For those who do not, perhaps it is time to take action.

## Key Companies in ASEAN outside Singapore

We highlight traditional retailers who have built robust ecommerce business although scant data is available.

1) OfficeMate in Thailand whose online operations account for $\sim 30 \%$ of group revenue. OfficeMate is an office stationary and equipment distributor listed in Thailand. It is a part of the Central Group, which is one of Thailand's largest retail players.

To promote online sales, OfficeMate offers free delivery within Thailand on orders over Bt499. The customers in and around Bangkok also get next day delivery. OfficeMate has its own fleet of delivery trucks in Bangkok and surrounding areas and outsource some services to ensure fast and accurate delivery. As many of the corporates and online shoppers are centred on Bangkok, this would cover a large portion of OfficeMate's clientele. OfficeMate also supports myriad of payment options, including cash on delivery, credit card, PayPal, Paysbuy, and mobile EDC. In addition, it has $24 \times 7$ online chat support and call centre to answer any customer queries. It's online and call centre operations accounted for $30 \%$ of its revenue in 3Q14 while seeing a $34 \%$ y-o-y growth during the same period. In 2014, the
company announced plans to expand in to neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos and Cambodia. Online retailing is relatively under penetrated in these countries giving OfficeMate a huge opportunity to grow its network.
2) Big C in Thailand for O 2 O adoption, although online sales are not disclosed. Big C operates in the retail business, mostly in the form of "Hypermarkets" or "Supercentres". Big C has a total of 122 branches as at end of 2014, divided into 50 branches in Bangkok and 72 branches in the provinces.

While continuing their own online retail site and mobile app "Big C Shopping Online", Big C has also entered into a partnership with Cdiscount in 2014 to grow its online sales in Thailand and Vietnam. Cdiscount is an online retailer based in France who has been aggressively competing on price, which has been successful in France. Cdiscount is known to give big discounts on popular products, which is made possible by their supply strategy of buying in large quantities at the lowest prices. According to Cdiscount, 1 out of every 3 online shopper in France have purchased items from them. The model also utilizes the O2O concept, where shoppers pick up products at the store after purchasing online, rather than having them delivered. This is also practical with Big C's omni channel presence given their comprehensive store network and the distribution footprint. Furthermore, Cdiscount conducts marketing tailored to local specificities.
3) CP ALL in Thailand for using its 7-Eleven stores as collection points. CP ALL primarily operates Thailand's 7Eleven stores and also has some cash and carry business. By the end of 2014 it operated 8,127 7-Eleven stores, making it the largest such chain in the country and recorded a revenue of Bt396 bn (Bt229 bn from 7Eleven). $55 \%$ of the stores were located outside Bangkok and its suburbs.

The company has a retail management unit to operate its online shopping and 24 hour services in 2014. Orders could be placed through e-commerce websites, via phone as well as through in-store catalogues at 7-Eleven outlets. The consumer could expect delivery to his or her home or to a designated 7 -Eleven branch. The wide spread distribution of 7-Eleven stores is likely to add to the convenience and trust while reducing costs giving the business a competitive advantage. The company targeted online sales of Bt 4.3 bn for the first year (2014) though the exact revenue generated and its profitability is not clear.

Alibaba Group Holding (NOT RATED US\$84.90; BABA US)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Mar (RMB m) | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 3,131 | 5,489 | 8,583 |
| EBITDA | 920 | 1,858 | 4,344 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 865 | 1,608 | 4,381 |
| Net Profit | 661 | 1,357 | 3,811 |
| EPS (RMB) | 0.27 | 0.58 | 1.73 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 266.0 | 117.7 | 198.0 |
| Net DPS (RMB) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| BV Per Share (RMB) | 2.0 | $(0.0)$ | 2.1 |
| PE (X) |  |  | 45.8 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) |  |  | 41.9 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) |  |  | 0.0 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) |  | 3.0 | 1.0 |
| ROA (\%) |  | 15.4 | 26.6 |

General Data


Cash Flow Statement (RMB m)

| FY Mar | 2012A | 2013A | 2014 A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Profit | 661 | 1,357 | 3,811 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 136 | 149 | 270 |
| Chg in Non-Cash Capital | 280 | 499 | $(734)$ |
| Other Non-Cash Adjustments | 374 | 298 | 965 |
| Cash From Opg Activities | 1,450 | 2,302 | 4,312 |
| Capital Expenditures | $(339)$ | $(350)$ | $(781)$ |
| Other Investing Activities | 319 | 437 | $(4,613)$ |
| Cash From Invsmt Activities | $(20)$ | 87 | $(5,394)$ |
| Div Paid | - | $(16)$ | $(34)$ |
| Chg in ST Borrowings | 19 | 4,283 | 2,091 |
| Capital Issues | 88 | $(2,044)$ | $(540)$ |
| Other Financing Activities | $(41)$ | $(2,458)$ | $(1)$ |
| Cash From Fin Activities | 66 | $(236)$ | 1,515 |
| Foreign Currency Translation | $1,-\overline{-}$ |  |  |
| Net Changes in Cash | 1,497 | 2,153 | 433 |

Rates \& Ratio

| FY Mar | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Gross Margins (\%) | 67.3 | 71.8 | 74.5 |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 25.0 | 31.1 | 47.5 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 21.1 | 24.7 | 44.4 |
| ROAE (\%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| ROA (\%) | 0.0 | 15.4 | 26.6 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | - | - | - |
| Asset Turnover (x) | - | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.2 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 73.8 | 6.8 | 11.4 |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 0.0 | 3.0 | 1.0 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | $1,11.3$ | $1,904.0$ | $3,531.3$ |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.6 |


| JD.com Inc (JD US Equity, US\$35.02, Buy,Target Pric Forecast \& Valuation |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FY Dec (RMB m) | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Turnover | 69,340 | 115,002 | 181,785 | 267,736 |
| EBITDA | 182 | 1,795 | 1,965 | 3,640 |
| Pre-tax Profit | $(2,485)$ | $(12,935)$ | $(1,627)$ | (524) |
| Net Profit | $(2,485)$ | $(12,954)$ | $(1,627)$ | (524) |
| Core Profit (non-GAAP) | 224 | 363 | 444 | 2,010 |
| EPS (RMB) | (1.80) | (9.37) | (1.18) | (0.38) |
| EPS (US\$) | (0.29) | (1.51) | (0.19) | (0.06) |
| Core EPS (US\$) | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.23 |
| Core EPS (RMB) | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 1.45 |
| BV Per Share (US\$) | 0.20 | 4.37 | 4.17 | 4.10 |
| Core PE (X) | 1344.0 | 829.7 | 678.3 | 149.7 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 84.3 | nm | 45.4 | 39.8 |
| P/Free CF ( $X$ ) | 127.6 | nm | 54.2 | 46.5 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 1622.6 | 150.8 | 136.2 | 72.7 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 174.7 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 8.6 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |
| ROAE (\%) | (165.4) | (66.1) | (4.4) | (1.5) |


|  |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| General Data |  |
| Issued Capital (m shrs) | 1,382 |
| Mkt. Cap (US\$m) | 48,505 |
| Major Shareholders | 20.3 |
| Mr. Richard Qiangdong Liu (\%) | 17.9 |
| Tencent (\%) | 15.8 |
| Tiger Global Management (\%) | 46.0 |
| Free Float (\%) | 8,403 |
| Avg. Daily Vol.('000) |  |
| Price Relative |  |




| Balance Sheet (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| Net Fixed Assets | 2,262 | 4,337 | 5,422 | 6,506 |
| Invts in Assocs \& JVs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other LT Assets | 1,268 | 12,214 | 12,172 | 12,589 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 14,603 | 32,115 | 35,691 | 39,464 |
| Inventory | 6,386 | 12,191 | 14,056 | 19,540 |
| Debtors | 502 | 2,436 | 2,073 | 2,907 |
| Other Current Assets | 989 | 3,200 | 2,660 | 3,613 |
| Total Assets | 26,010 | 66,493 | 72,074 | 84,619 |
| ST Debt | 933 | 1,891 | 2,363 | 3,073 |
| Other Current Liab | 15,837 | 27,104 | 33,934 | 46,411 |
| LT Debt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other LT Liabilities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 9,240 | 37,498 | 35,777 | 35,136 |
| Minority Interests | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 26,010 | 66,493 | 72,074 | 84,619 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Cap | $(7,960)$ | $(9,277)$ | $(15,144)$ | $(20,350)$ |
| Net Cash/(Debt) | 13,670 | 30,224 | 33,327 | 36,391 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Segmental Breakdown (RMB |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| Revenues (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| Online direct sales | 67,018 | 108,549 | 169,346 | 247,122 |
| Services \& other incomes | 2,322 | 6,453 | 12,439 | 20,614 |
| Total | 69,340 | 115,002 | 181,785 | 267,736 |
| Gross profit (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| Online direct sales | 4,522 | 6,918 | 10,792 | 15,996 |
| Services \& other incomes | 2,322 | 6,453 | 12,439 | 20,614 |
| Total | 6,844 | 13,371 | 23,232 | 36,610 |

Chow Tai Fook Jewellery (NOT RATED HK\$9.86;
Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Mar (HK\$ m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 35,043 | 56,571 | 57,434 | 77,407 |
| EBITDA | 5,808 | 9,343 | 8,058 | 10,254 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 4,620 | 8,166 | 7,095 | 9,163 |
| Net Profit | 3,538 | 6,341 | 5,505 | 7,272 |
| EPS (HK\$) | 0.40 | 0.69 | 0.55 | 0.73 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 65.3 | 73.4 | $(19.6)$ | 31.9 |
| Net DPS (HK\$) | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.22 | 0.36 |
| BV Per Share (HK\$) | - | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.7 |
| PE (X) | - | 18.0 | 19.2 | 16.8 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) |  |  | 10.9 |  |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | - | 13.7 | 13.0 | 12.7 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | - | 0.8 | 2.1 | 2.9 |
| P/Book Value (X) | - | 4.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| ROA (\%) | 15.4 | 16.6 | 12.1 | 13.8 |
| ROE (\%) | 36.4 | 31.5 | 17.8 | 20.7 |

General Data


Balance Sheet (HK\$ m)

| FY Mar | 2011 A | 2012 A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 1,253 | 1,783 | 2,327 | 3,229 |
| Other LT Assets | 293 | 373 | 1,114 | 1,034 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 5,605 | 9,988 | 8,305 | 9,967 |
| Inventory | 17,101 | 29,694 | 27,315 | 42,544 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 1,632 | 4,036 | 3,048 | 3,146 |
| Other Current Assets | 3,165 | 1,541 | 1,109 | 1,898 |
| Total Assets | 29,049 | 47,414 | 43,219 | 61,817 |
| Short Term Borrowings | 7,202 | 11,381 | 5,836 | 17,086 |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 384 | 445 | 249 | 1,234 |
| Other Current Liab | 9,627 | 2,392 | 2,328 | 4,187 |
| LT Borrowings | 0 | 3,426 | 0 | 0 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 163 | 197 | 945 | 858 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 11,673 | 29,573 | 33,861 | 38,452 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 29,049 | 47,414 | 43,219 | 61,817 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 4,685 | 21,053 | 23,059 | 25,081 |
| Net Debt/Cash | 1,597 | 4,819 | CASH | 7,120 |
|  |  |  |  |  |


| Rates \& Ratio |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Mar | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| Gross Margins (\%) | 28.3 | 29.1 | 28.4 | 27.3 |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 15.8 | 15.8 | 13.1 | 12.4 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 10.1 | 11.2 | 9.6 | 9.4 |
| ROAE (\%) | 36.4 | 31.5 | 17.8 | 20.7 |
| ROA (\%) | 15.4 | 16.6 | 12.1 | 13.8 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | 0.0 | 15.8 | 40.0 | 49.5 |
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
| A/Cs Receivable Turnover | 26.1 | 20.0 | 16.2 | 25.0 |
| A/Cs Payable Turnover | 86.1 | 127.2 | 111.7 | 96.4 |
| Inventory Turn | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.6 |
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.6 | 3.2 | 4.7 | 2.6 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 0.6 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 54.3 | 24.6 | 22.9 | 43.0 |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | $(3,413$. | $(7,778.9)$ | $8,846.5$ | $(6,660.7)$ |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | $(0.4)$ | $(0.8)$ | 0.9 | $(0.7)$ |

Chow Sang Sang (BUY HK\$17.88; 116 HK; Price Target : HK\$ 21.91)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (HK\$ m) | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 25,142 | 19,246 | 20,124 | 21,834 |
| EBITDA | 1,605 | 1,524 | 1,673 | 1,895 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 1,512 | 1,362 | 1,488 | 1,694 |
| Net Profit | 1,218 | 1,082 | 1,182 | 1,345 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 1,141 | 1,075 | 1,182 | 1,345 |
| EPS (HK cts) | 180.0 | 159.9 | 174.5 | 198.7 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (HK cts) | 168.5 | 158.8 | 174.5 | 198.7 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | 23 | $(6)$ | 10 | 14 |
| Diluted EPS (HK cts) | 180.0 | 159.9 | 174.5 | 198.7 |
| Net DPS (HK cts) | 68.0 | 61.0 | 66.3 | 75.5 |
| BV Per Share (HK cts) | $1,172.2$ | $1,277.4$ | $1,385.6$ | $1,508.7$ |
| PE (X) | 9.9 | 11.2 | 10.2 | 9.0 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 10.6 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 9.0 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 14.3 | 18.8 | 10.4 | 12.2 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 8.1 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 6.8 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.2 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| ROAE (\%) | 16.3 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 13.7 |

General Data


Balance Sheet (HK\$ m)

| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 1,014 | 1,042 | 1,236 | 1,297 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 23 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| Other LT Assets | 889 | 1,147 | 1,170 | 1,196 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 1,035 | 1,022 | 1,013 | 1,048 |
| Inventory | 6,866 | 7,385 | 7,612 | 8,191 |
| Debtors | 1,129 | 1,195 | 1,250 | 1,356 |
| Other Current Assets | 386 | 426 | 426 | 426 |
| Total Assets | 11,342 | 12,242 | 12,732 | 13,539 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ST Debt | 1,405 | 1,728 | 1,419 | 1,275 |
| Other Current Liab | 1,313 | 1,180 | 1,230 | 1,330 |
| LT Debt | 454 | 526 | 526 | 526 |
| Other LT Liabilities | 152 | 161 | 177 | 195 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 7,935 | 8,647 | 9,379 | 10,213 |
| Minority Interests | 84 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 11,342 | 12,242 | 12,732 | 13,539 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 7,068 | 7,827 | 8,058 | 8,643 |
| Net Cash/(Debt) | $(824)$ | $(1,233)$ | $(933)$ | $(754)$ |


| Segmental Breakdown |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| Revenues (HK\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| Manufacture \& retail of jewellery | 19,943 | 16,933 | 17,590 | 19,057 |
| Wholesale of precious metals | 5,001 | 2,108 | 2,319 | 2,551 |
| Securities \& futures broking | 35 | 40 | 42 | 44 |
| Other businesses | 164 | 166 | 174 | 183 |
| Total | 25,142 | 19,246 | 20,124 | 21,834 |

Segmental profit (HK\$ m)
Manufacture \& retail of jewellery $1,350 \quad 1,255 \quad 1,357 \quad 1,527$

Wholesale of precious metals

| 1,350 | 1,255 | 1,357 | 1,527 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 68 | 22 | 25 | 27 |
| 15 | 20 | 21 | 23 |
| 58 | 44 | 47 | 49 |
| 1,492 | 1,342 | 1,449 | 1,626 |

Segmental profit Margins (\%)
$\begin{array}{lllll}\text { Manufacture \& retail of jewellery } & 6.8 & 7.4 & 7.7 & 8.0\end{array}$
Wholesale of precious metals
Securities \& futures broking
Other businesses
Total

| 6.8 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 8.0 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| 43.8 | 50.1 | 51.1 | 52.1 |
| 35.6 | 26.7 | 26.7 | 26.7 |
| 5.9 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.4 |

Source: Company, DBS Vickers

Luk Fook Holdings (BUY HK\$25.10; 590 HK; Price Target : HK\$ 28.46)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Mar (HK\$ m) | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F | 2017 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 19,215 | 16,536 | 17,387 | 18,923 |
| EBITDA | 2,373 | 2,085 | 2,180 | 2,414 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 2,321 | 1,990 | 2,079 | 2,305 |
| Net Profit | 1,865 | 1,591 | 1,662 | 1,843 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 1,865 | 1,591 | 1,662 | 1,843 |
| EPS (HK cts) | 316.6 | 270.0 | 282.1 | 312.8 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (HK cts) | 316.6 | 270.0 | 282.1 | 312.8 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | 47 | $(15)$ | 4 | 111 |
| Diluted EPS (HK cts) | 316.6 | 270.0 | 282.1 | 312.8 |
| Net DPS (HK cts) | 126.8 | 108.0 | 112.8 | 125.1 |
| BV Per Share (HK cts) | $1,297.0$ | $1,457.9$ | $1,630.0$ | $1,824.8$ |
| PE (X) | 7.9 | 9.3 | 8.9 | 8.0 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 7.9 | 9.3 | 8.9 | 8.0 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 16.7 | 4.8 | 9.0 | 8.8 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 5.7 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 4.0 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 5.1 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 5.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.4 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |
| ROAE (\%) | 26.5 | 19.6 | 18.3 | 18.1 |

Income Statement (HK\$ m)

| FY Mar | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F | 2017F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 19,215 | 16,536 | 17,387 | 18,923 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(15,001)$ | $(12,628)$ | $(13,252)$ | $(14,366)$ |
| Gross Profit | 4,214 | 3,908 | 4,135 | 4,557 |
| Other Opng (Exp)/Inc | $(1,905)$ | $(1,887)$ | $(2,019)$ | $(2,206)$ |
| Operating Profit | 2,309 | 2,021 | 2,116 | 2,351 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 12 | (32) | (39) | (46) |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 2,321 | 1,990 | 2,079 | 2,305 |
| Tax | (454) | (379) | (396) | (439) |
| Minority Interest | (2) | (20) | (21) | (23) |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 1,865 | 1,591 | 1,662 | 1,843 |
| Net Profit before Except. | 1,865 | 1,591 | 1,662 | 1,843 |
| EBITDA | 2,373 | 2,085 | 2,180 | 2,414 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 43.3 | (13.9) | 5.1 | 8.8 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 45.9 | (12.1) | 4.5 | 10.7 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 51.0 | (12.5) | 4.7 | 11.1 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 47.3 | (14.7) | 4.5 | 10.9 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 19.5 | 19.0 | 19.0 | 19.0 |
| Cash Flow Statement (HK\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Mar | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F | 2017F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 2,321 | 1,990 | 2,079 | 2,305 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 64 | 63 | 63 | 62 |
| Tax Paid | (454) | (379) | (396) | (439) |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | $(1,032)$ | 1,393 | (143) | (301) |
| Other Operating CF | (13) | 31 | 38 | 45 |
| Net Operating CF | 886 | 3,098 | 1,640 | 1,673 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | (184) | (210) | (200) | (220) |
| Other Invts.(net) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Other Investing CF | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Net Investing CF | (183) | (208) | (198) | (218) |
| Div Paid | (747) | (636) | (665) | (737) |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 568 | 114 | 136 | 164 |
| Capital Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | (2) | (2) | (2) | (2) |
| Net Financing CF | (181) | (524) | (530) | (575) |
| Net Cashflow | 522 | 2,366 | 912 | 879 |

General Data

Issued Capital (m shrs)

| Mkt. Cap (HK\$m/US\$m) | $14,787 / 1,908$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Major Shareholders | 42.2 |
| $\quad$ Wong Wai Sheung (\%) | 6.0 |
| $\quad$ Templeton Asset Management Ltd. (\%) | 51.8 |
| Free Float (\%) | 1,684 |
| Avg. Daily Vol.('000) |  |
| Price Relative |  |



Balance Sheet (HK\$ m)

| FY Mar | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F | 2017 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 749 | 777 | 807 | 838 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Other LT Assets | 285 | 271 | 271 | 271 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 1,819 | 4,244 | 5,227 | 6,214 |
| Inventory | 6,225 | 5,171 | 5,354 | 5,726 |
| Debtors | 501 | 431 | 453 | 493 |
| Other Current Assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Assets | 9,586 | 10,901 | 12,120 | 13,549 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ST Debt | 568 | 682 | 818 | 982 |
| Other Current Liab | 1,230 | 1,497 | 1,559 | 1,669 |
| LT Debt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other LT Liabilities | 89 | 69 | 69 | 69 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 7,641 | 8,589 | 9,602 | 10,750 |
| Minority Interests | 58 | 65 | 71 | 79 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 9,586 | 10,901 | 12,120 | 13,549 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 5,496 | 4,105 | 4,249 | 4,550 |
| Net Cash/(Debt) | 1,251 | 3,562 | 4,409 | 5,232 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Segmental Breakdown |  |  |  |  |
| FY Mar | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F | 2017 F |
| Revenues (HK\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| Retailing - HK, Macau \& overseas | 14,514 | 12,159 | 12,600 | 13,650 |
| Retailing - PRC | 1,650 | 1,336 | 1,355 | 1,427 |
| Wholesaling (incl | 2,433 | 2,299 | 2,574 | 2,864 |
| Licensing | 618 | 742 | 858 | 981 |
| Total | 19,215 | 16,536 | 17,387 | 18,923 |


| Segmental profit (HK\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Retailing - HK, Macau \& overseas | 1,660 | 1,391 | 1,441 | 1,561 |
| Retailing - PRC | 39 | 32 | 32 | 34 |
| Wholesaling (incl | 332 | 314 | 352 | 391 |
| $\quad$ Licensing | 413 | 496 | 574 | 656 |
| Total | 2,445 | 2,233 | 2,399 | 2,642 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Segmental profit Margins (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Retailing - HK, Macau \& overseas | 11.4 | 11.4 | 11.4 | 11.4 |
| Retailing - PRC | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Wholesaling (incl | 13.7 | 13.7 | 13.7 | 13.7 |
| Licensing | 66.8 | 66.8 | 66.8 | 66.8 |
| Total | 12.7 | 13.5 | 13.8 | 14.0 |

Hour Glass Ltd (NOT RATED S\$0.80; HG SP)
Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Mar (S\$ m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 | 0.0014 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 517.6 | 607.0 | 601.9 | 682.8 |
| EBITDA | 55.2 | 71.9 | 66.6 | 70.6 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 54.3 | 69.3 | 65.9 | 70.8 |
| Net Profit | 42.4 | 54.8 | 52.8 | 54.9 |
| EPS (S cts) | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 28.6 | 28.9 | $(3.6)$ | 4.0 |
| Net DPS (S\$) | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| BV Per Share (S\$) | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| PE (X) | 5.5 | 5.7 | 8.2 | 7.1 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 11.3 | 10.8 | 32.6 | 6.1 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 3.7 | 3.8 | 6.1 | 4.6 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 5.0 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 3.6 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.1 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| ROA (\%) | 14.4 | 16.3 | 13.4 | 12.2 |
| ROE (\%) | 18.2 | 20.1 | 16.9 | 15.8 |



Balance Sheet (S\$ m)

| FY Mar | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 43.8 | 42.9 | 48.7 | 54.9 |
| Other LT Assets | 12.0 | 13.1 | 15.6 | 17.8 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 50.7 | 53.7 | 79.5 | 116.4 |
| Inventory | 190.7 | 231.0 | 265.7 | 263.3 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 11.3 | 11.6 | 13.8 | 15.1 |
| Other Current Assets | 6.0 | 6.5 | 7.1 | 5.7 |
| Total Assets | 314.5 | 358.7 | 430.5 | 473.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Short Term Borrowings | 14.3 | 3.1 | 41.2 | 39.7 |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 10.3 | 42.0 | 40.5 | 47.6 |
| Other Current Liab | 30.9 | 9.6 | 8.2 | 8.8 |
| LT Borrowings | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 1.6 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 257.5 | 303.8 | 340.3 | 376.7 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 314.5 | 358.7 | 430.5 | 473.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 152.6 | 194.4 | 196.8 | 187.9 |
| Net Debt/Cash | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |
|  |  |  |  |  |


| Rates \& Ratio |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Mar | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| Gross Margins (\%) | 22.4 | 24.1 | 23.9 | 23.0 |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 9.8 | 10.9 | 10.1 | 9.4 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 8.2 | 9.0 | 8.8 | 8.0 |
| ROAE (\%) | 18.2 | 20.1 | 16.9 | 15.8 |
| ROA (\%) | 14.4 | 16.3 | 13.4 | 12.2 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | 27.7 | 25.8 | 24.5 | 25.7 |
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| A/Cs Receivable Turnover | 50.2 | 53.0 | 47.3 | 47.3 |
| A/Cs Payable Turnover | 42.5 | 19.2 | 12.0 | 11.9 |
| Inventory Turn | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 2.0 |
| Current Ratio (x) | 4.7 | 5.5 | 4.1 | 4.2 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.4 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 92.0 | 208.9 | 124.5 | 130.6 |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | 8.5 | 24.9 | 1.9 | 53.1 |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 |

Cortina Holdings (NOT RATED S\$0.80; CTN SP)
Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Mar (\$\$ m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 | M 014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 295.8 | 339.8 | 367.4 | 415.1 |
| EBITDA | 22.0 | 31.8 | 27.8 | 27.8 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 15.7 | 26.0 | 20.9 | 22.5 |
| Net Profit | 13.0 | 21.2 | 16.5 | 18.4 |
| EPS (S\$) | 0.08 | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.11 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 5.4 | 64.1 | (21.9) | 11.0 |
| Net DPS (S\$) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| BV Per Share (S\$) | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| PE (X) | - | 4.1 | 8.6 | 7.4 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | - | 15.0 | - | 8.1 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | - | 4.8 | 9.1 | 8.6 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | - | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
| P/Book Value (X) |  | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| ROA (\%) | 6.6 | 10.0 | 6.5 | 6.4 |
| ROE (\%) | 13.5 | 19.4 | 13.5 | 13.7 |

General Data


| Balance Sheet (S\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Mar | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| Net Fixed Assets | 10.9 | 11.0 | 30.8 | 11.8 |
| Other LT Assets | 6.9 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 8.2 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 11.5 | 10.9 | 7.6 | 14.5 |
| Inventory | 157.9 | 179.9 | 223.8 | 216.7 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 9.8 | 12.1 | 13.2 | 13.6 |
| Other Current Assets | 2.2 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 22.4 |
| Total Assets | 199.2 | 224.7 | 286.1 | 287.1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Short Term Borrowings | 67.3 | 69.2 | 98.4 | 99.6 |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 17.2 | 23.4 | 27.9 | 23.5 |
| Other Current Liab | 5.6 | 6.8 | 9.7 | 4.8 |
| LT Borrowings | 0.0 | 0.0 | 14.5 | 10.7 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 3.2 | 1.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 106.0 | 123.6 | 134.5 | 147.5 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 199.2 | 224.7 | 286.1 | 287.1 |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 79.9 | 96.1 | 103.9 | 124.7 |
| Net Debt/Cash | 55.8 | 58.3 | 105.3 | 95.8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |


| Rates \& Ratio |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Mar | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| Gross Margins (\%) | - | - | - | - |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 6.5 | 8.4 | 6.5 | 5.7 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 4.4 | 6.2 | 4.5 | 4.4 |
| ROAE (\%) | 13.5 | 19.4 | 13.5 | 13.7 |
| ROA (\%) | 6.6 | 10.0 | 6.5 | 6.4 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | 31.9 | 39.1 | 30.1 | 27.0 |
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| A/Cs Receivable Turnover | 34.9 | 31.0 | 29.0 | 31.0 |
| A/Cs Payable Turnover | - | - | - | - |
| Inventory Turn | - | - | - | - |
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 8.8 | 9.4 | 7.0 | 8.0 |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | 2.8 | 2.7 | -22.4 | 11.2 |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | 0.0 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.1 |

Sheng Siong Group (BUY S\$0.84; SSG SP; Price Target : S\$ 0.90)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (S\$ m) | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 687 | 726 | 796 | 831 |
| EBITDA | 52 | 63 | 72 | 75 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 48 | 57 | 65 | 68 |
| Net Profit | 39 | 47 | 53 | 56 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 39 | 47 | 53 | 56 |
| EPS (S cts) | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (S cts) | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | 25 | 11 | 13 | 5 |
| Diluted EPS (S cts) | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.7 |
| Net DPS (S cts) | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 |
| BV Per Share (S cts) | 10.8 | 15.7 | 16.1 | 16.4 |
| PE (X) | 29.9 | 26.9 | 23.9 | 22.7 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 29.9 | 26.9 | 23.9 | 22.7 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 24.7 | 17.1 | 17.3 | 17.2 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 20.6 | 18.0 | 15.9 | 15.2 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 7.8 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.1 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |
| ROAE (\%) | 25.8 | 24.3 | 22.1 | 22.8 |


| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 687 | 726 | 796 | 831 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | (529) | (550) | (601) | (628) |
| Gross Profit | 158 | 176 | 195 | 203 |
| Other Opng (Exp)/Inc | (117) | (124) | (136) | (141) |
| Operating Profit | 42 | 52 | 59 | 62 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 48 | 57 | 65 | 68 |
| Tax | (9) | (10) | (12) | (12) |
| Minority Interest | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 39 | 47 | 53 | 56 |
| Net Profit before Except. | 39 | 47 | 53 | 56 |
| EBITDA | 52 | 63 | 72 | 75 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 7.9 | 5.6 | 9.7 | 4.3 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 19.8 | 21.9 | 13.5 | 5.5 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 19.8 | 25.3 | 12.5 | 5.7 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | (6.6) | 20.8 | 12.6 | 5.1 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 18.2 | 17.8 | 18.0 | 18.0 |
| Cash Flow Statement (S\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016 F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 48 | 57 | 65 | 68 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 12 | 13 | 15 | 15 |
| Tax Paid | (9) | (7) | (11) | (12) |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | (3) | 12 | 4 | 2 |
| Other Operating CF | (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Operating CF | 47 | 74 | 73 | 74 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | (26) | (81) | (30) | (30) |
| Other Invts.(net) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Investing CF | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Investing CF | (25) | (80) | (30) | (30) |
| Div Paid | (41) | (40) | (48) | (50) |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Capital Issues | 0 | 79 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Financing CF | (41) | 39 | (48) | (50) |
| Net Cashflow | (19) | 33 | (5) | (7) |

General Data


Balance Sheet ( $\$ \$ \mathrm{~m}$ )

| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 91 | 161 | 178 | 195 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other LT Assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 100 | 130 | 123 | 114 |
| Inventory | 46 | 43 | 47 | 49 |
| Debtors | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 |
| Other Current Assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | 248 | 345 | 361 | 371 |

ST Debt

| Other Current Liab | 96 | 107 | 117 | 122 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| LT Debt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Other LT Liabilities
Shareholder's Equity
Minority Interests

## Total Cap. \& Liab.

| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | (38) | (53) | (58) | (61) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Net Cash/(Debt) | 100 | 130 | 123 | 114 |

Segmental Breakdown

| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenues (S\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| Singapore | 687 | 726 | 796 | 831 |
| Total | 687 | 726 | 796 | 831 |
| Operating profit (S\$ m) |  |  |  |  |
| Singapore | 42 | 52 | 59 | 62 |
| Total | 42 | 52 | 59 | 62 |
| Operating profit Margins (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Singapore | 6.1 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 7.5 |
| Total | 6.1 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 7.5 |

Source: Company, DBS Bank

Officemate (NOT RATED Bt61.25; COL TB)
Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (Bt m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 5,780 | 6,786 | 8,679 | 9,378 |
| EBITDA | 334 | 502 | 712 | 768 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 233 | 379 | 514 | 551 |
| Net Profit | 121 | 272 | 409 | 439 |
| EPS (Bt) | 0.50 | 1.12 | 1.28 | 1.37 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | $(2.0)$ | 124.0 | 14.3 | 7.0 |
| Net DPS (Bt) | 0.26 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| BV Per Share (Bt) | 9.9 | 13.2 | 14.3 | 15.2 |
| PE (X) | 36.6 | 52.2 | 23.0 | 35.4 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 16.0 | 35.6 | 19.4 | 24.4 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 6.5 | 35.9 | 12.1 | 18.9 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 1.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 1.9 | 4.4 | 2.1 | 3.2 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| ROA (\%) | 7.3 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| ROE (\%) | 15.7 | 9.8 | 9.3 | 9.3 |


| Income Statement (Bt m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011 A | 2012 A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| Turnover | 5,780 | 6,786 | 8,679 | 9,378 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | 5,286 | 5,157 | 6,560 | 7,035 |
| Gross Profit | 494 | 1,629 | 2,119 | 2,343 |
| Selling, General \& Admin | 565 | 1,623 | 2,046 | 2,351 |
| Operating Profit | 234 | 368 | 503 | 532 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | $(4)$ | $(15)$ | $(11)$ | $(19)$ |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 6 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| Forex Losses (Gains) | - | - | - |  |
| Pre-tax Profit | 233 | 379 | 514 | 551 |
| Tax | 112 | 108 | 105 | 111 |
| Minority Interest | 0 | - | 0 | 1 |
| Preference Dividend | - | - | - | - |
| Net Profit | 121 | 272 | 409 | 439 |
| EBITDA | 334 | 502 | 712 | 768 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 453.0 | 17.4 | 27.9 | 8.1 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 416.1 | 50.3 | 41.7 | 7.9 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 436.0 | 57.0 | 36.7 | 5.7 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 247.0 | 124.8 | 50.4 | 7.5 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 48.1 | 28.3 | 20.4 | 20.1 |



Balance Sheet (Bt m)

| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 296 | 574 | 737 | 770 |
| Other LT Assets | 287 | 3,438 | 3,424 | 3,457 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 377 | 722 | 813 | 1,029 |
| Inventory | 871 | 1,266 | 1,411 | 1,531 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 205 | 273 | 313 | 281 |
| Other Current Assets | 845 | 133 | 262 | 285 |
| Total Assets | 2,881 | 6,405 | 6,961 | 7,354 |
| Short Term Borrowings |  |  |  |  |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 105 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Current Liab | 288 | 1,719 | 1,850 | 1,963 |
| LT Borrowings | 0 | 359 | 462 | 458 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 20 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 1,316 | 4,239 | 4,567 | 4,851 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 2,881 | 6,405 | 6,961 | 7,354 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 376 | $(341)$ | $(297)$ | $(39)$ |
| Net Debt/Cash | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |

General Data

Net Debt/Cash
(39)

CASH

Cash Flow Statement (Bt m)

| Cash Flow Statement (Bt m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| Net Profit | 121 | 272 | 409 | 439 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 100 | 134 | 209 | 236 |
| Chng in Non-Cash Capital | $(114)$ | 47 | $(186)$ | $(45)$ |
| Other Non-Cash | 167 | $(55)$ | 55 | 5 |
| Cash From Opg Activities | 274 | 398 | 487 | 636 |
| Capital Expenditures | $(127)$ | $(196)$ | $(290)$ | $(201)$ |
| Other Investing Activities | $(734)$ | 567 | 20 | $(316)$ |
| Cash From Invsmt Activities | $(861)$ | 371 | $(270)$ | $(517)$ |
| Div Paid | - | $(387)$ | $(80)$ | $(160)$ |
| Chg in ST Borrowings | - | $(104)$ | $(6)$ | - |
| Capital Issues | - | - | - | - |
| Other Financing Activities | - | - | - | - |
| Cash From Fin Activities | $(1)$ | $(492)$ | $(86)$ | $(160)$ |
| Foreign Currency | - | - | - | - |
| Net Changes in Cash | $(587)$ | 277 | 131 | $(41)$ |


| Rates \& Ratio |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| Gross Margins (\%) | 8.5 | 24.0 | 24.4 | 25.0 |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 4.1 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 5.7 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 2.1 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| ROAE (\%) | 15.7 | 9.8 | 9.3 | 9.3 |
| ROA (\%) | 7.3 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 6.1 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | 28.6 | 53.0 | 39.1 | 36.4 |
| Asset Turnover (x) | 3.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| A/Cs Receivable Turnover | 38.8 | 28.4 | 29.6 | 31.6 |
| A/CS Payable Turnover | 9.1 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Inventory Turn | 11.1 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.8 |
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 41.5 | 92.9 | 945.0 | $20,790.3$ |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | 141.3 | 199.4 | 188.2 | 432.0 |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.4 |

Big C Supercenter (NOT RATED Bt226.00; BIGC TB)

| Forecasts and Valuation |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec (Bt m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| Turnover | 109,548 | 120,062 | 126,922 | 131,230 |
| EBITDA | 11,593 | 12,547 | 13,163 | 13,860 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 7,015 | 7,841 | 8,492 | 9,005 |
| Net Profit | 5,242 | 6,074 | 6,976 | 7,235 |
| EPS (Bt) | 6.54 | 7.44 | 8.46 | 8.77 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 86.3 | 13.8 | 13.7 | 3.7 |
| Net DPS (Bt) | 1.96 | 2.21 | 2.55 | 2.62 |
| BV Per Share (Bt) | 29.3 | 38.6 | 44.9 | 51.1 |
| PE (X) | 18.3 | 27.8 | 21.7 | 27.0 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 11.3 | 14.4 | 15.0 | 16.8 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 10.8 | 15.2 | 13.0 | 15.1 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 4.1 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 4.6 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 1.6 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| ROA (\%) | 8.0 | 6.6 | 7.3 | 7.2 |
| ROE (\%) | 24.1 | 21.9 | 20.3 | 18.3 |

General Data


| Balance Sheet (Bt m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | $2013 A$ | 2014 A |
| Net Fixed Assets | 26,347 | 28,027 | 31,253 | 30,821 |
| Other LT Assets | 43,478 | 43,725 | 44,130 | 44,227 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 7,422 | 8,780 | 7,175 | 11,414 |
| Inventory | 8,941 | 9,196 | 9,535 | 11,552 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 274 | 315 | 323 | 208 |
| Other Current Assets | 4,264 | 4,120 | 4,749 | 4,555 |
| Total Assets | 90,726 | 94,163 | 97,164 | 102,778 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Short Term Borrowings | 36,500 | 7,675 | 7,712 | 10,712 |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 21,015 | 22,820 | 22,794 | 24,603 |
| Other Current Liab | 6,427 | 6,485 | 6,650 | 6,788 |
| LT Borrowings | 0 | 21,580 | 18,898 | 14,213 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 3,264 | 3,715 | 4,073 | 4,317 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 23,520 | 31,887 | 37,038 | 42,147 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 90,726 | 94,163 | 97,164 | 102,778 |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | $(50,463)$ | $(23,350)$ | $(22,548)$ | $(25,786)$ |
| Net Debt/Cash | 29,078 | 20,475 | 19,435 | 13,511 |


| Rates \& Ratio |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| Gross Margins (\%) | 20.1 | 20.0 | 20.8 | 21.0 |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.6 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| ROAE (\%) | 24.1 | 21.9 | 20.3 | 18.3 |
| ROA (\%) | 8.0 | 6.6 | 7.3 | 7.2 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | 30.0 | 30.0 | 30.2 | 29.9 |
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 |
| A/Cs Receivable Turnover | 482.5 | 407.6 | 398.0 | 494.2 |
| A/Cs Payable Turnover | 4.9 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.5 |
| Inventory Turn | 12.4 | 10.6 | 10.7 | 9.8 |
| Current Ratio (x) | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 6.5 | 7.1 | 9.1 | 11.5 |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 1.6 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | 4637.0 | 6476.0 | 2945.4 | 8247.7 |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | 5.8 | 7.9 | 3.6 | 10.0 |

CP ALL (NOT RATED Bt42.75; CPALL TB)
Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (Bt m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 155,360 | 188,702 | 272,286 | 357,766 |
| EBITDA | 11,064 | 13,818 | 15,779 | 22,762 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 10,995 | 13,988 | 12,845 | 12,530 |
| Net Profit | 8,008 | 11,049 | 10,503 | 10,154 |
| EPS (Bt) | 0.89 | 1.23 | 1.17 | 1.13 |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 20.3 | 38.2 | $(4.9)$ | $(3.4)$ |
| Net DPS (Bt) | 0.63 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.80 |
| BV Per Share (Bt) | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.4 |
| PE (X) | 29.1 | 37.4 | 35.9 | 37.6 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 17.9 | 17.5 | 18.4 | 19.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 18.9 | 27.4 | 34.3 | 24.2 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 10.8 | 15.2 | 13.1 | 12.4 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.6 | 5.7 |
| ROA (\%) | 15.5 | 17.3 | 5.6 | 3.2 |
| ROE (\%) | 40.8 | 45.5 | 37.6 | 34.1 |

General Data


Balance Sheet (Bt m)

| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 15,305 | 18,419 | 73,226 | 82,852 |
| Other LT Assets | 3,632 | 4,894 | 176,819 | 178,874 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 14,202 | 35,056 | 25,682 | 33,436 |
| Inventory | 8,642 | 9,148 | 19,916 | 22,167 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 477 | 541 | 848 | 910 |
| Other Current Assets | 3,190 | 4,109 | 7,516 | 8,170 |
| Total Assets | 55,341 | 72,168 | 304,008 | 326,410 |
| Short Term Borrowings |  |  |  |  |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 24,393 | 32,580 | 54,734 | 59,312 |
| Other Current Liab | 6,084 | 8,445 | 10,893 | 13,002 |
| LT Borrowings | 0 | 0 | 50,166 | 178,779 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 3,163 | 3,788 | 20,074 | 20,558 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 21,699 | 27,355 | 32,970 | 35,058 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 55,341 | 72,168 | 304,008 | 326,410 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | $(8,277)$ | $(15,255)$ | $(171,468$ | $(59,535)$ |
| Net Debt/Cash | CASH | CASH | 159,654 | 165,044 |


| Income Statement (Bt m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011 A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| Turnover | 155,360 | 188,702 | 272,286 | 357,766 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | 116,863 | 140,091 | 210,657 | 281,443 |
| Gross Profit | 38,497 | 48,611 | 61,629 | 76,323 |
| Selling, General \& Admin | 34,032 | 43,736 | 58,384 | 68,809 |
| Operating Profit | 7,762 | 10,450 | 11,079 | 16,453 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | $-3,017$ | $-3,500$ | $-4,550$ | $-4,219$ |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 2,214 | 8,518 |
| Forex Losses (Gains) | -216 | -39 | 570 | -377 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 10,995 | 13,988 | 12,845 | 12,530 |
| Tax | 2,981 | 2,913 | 2,255 | 2,258 |
| Minority Interest | 6 | 26 | 88 | 119 |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Net Profit | 8,008 | 11,049 | 10,503 | 10,154 |
| EBITDA | 11,064 | 13,818 | 15,779 | 22,762 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 15.1 | 21.5 | 44.3 | 31.4 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 10.6 | 24.9 | 14.2 | 44.3 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 12.3 | 34.6 | 6.0 | 48.5 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 20.2 | 38.0 | $(4.9)$ | $(3.3)$ |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 27.1 | 20.8 | 17.6 | 18.0 |


| Cash Flow Statement (Bt m) |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| Net Profit | 8,008 | 11,049 | 10,503 | 10,154 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 3,302 | 3,368 | 4,700 | 6,310 |
| Chng in Non-Cash Capital | 1,782 | 9,134 | 3,679 | 1,913 |
| Other Non-Cash | $(106)$ | 115 | 1,665 | 839 |
| Cash From Opg Activities | 12,985 | 23,666 | 20,548 | 19,215 |
| Capital Expenditures | $(3,688)$ | $(6,040)$ | $(11,191)$ | $(13,835)$ |
| Other Investing Activities | $(6,345)$ | $(3,097)$ | $(180,852)$ | $(2,365)$ |
| Cash From Invsmt Activities | $(10,032)$ | $(9,137)$ | $(192,043)$ | $(16,200)$ |
| Div Paid | $(4,493)$ | $(5,612)$ | $(8,084)$ | $(8,085)$ |
| Chg in ST Borrowings | 2 | $(2)$ | 181,022 | 12,718 |
| Capital Issues | - | - | - | - |
| Other Financing Activities | 25 | $(31)$ | 104 | $(77)$ |
| Cash From Fin Activities | $(4,466)$ | $(5,646)$ | 173,042 | 4,557 |
| Foreign Currency | - | - | - | - |
| Net Changes in Cash | $(1,514)$ | 8,883 | 1,547 | 7,572 |

Springland (HOLD HK\$3.03; 1700 HK; Price Target : HK\$ 2.78)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (RMB m) | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 4,162 | 4,276 | 4,412 | 4,630 |
| EBITDA | 1,286 | 1,174 | 1,270 | 1,392 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 1,035 | 920 | 915 | 982 |
| Net Profit | 730 | 634 | 638 | 685 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 730 | 634 | 638 | 685 |
| EPS (HK cts) | 36.4 | 31.9 | 32.2 | 34.6 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (HK cts) | 36.4 | 31.9 | 32.2 | 34.6 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | 12 | 122 | 1 | 7 |
| Diluted EPS (HK cts) | 36.4 | 31.9 | 32.2 | 34.6 |
| Net DPS (HK cts) | 18.3 | 16.7 | 16.1 | 17.3 |
| BV Per Share (HK cts) | 239.9 | 251.3 | 267.5 | 284.7 |
| PE (X) | 8.3 | 9.5 | 9.4 | 8.8 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 8.3 | 9.5 | 9.4 | 8.8 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 6.1 | 10.0 | 3.9 | 4.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 6.4 | 6.0 | 6.3 | 6.4 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.7 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| ROAE (\%) | 15.7 | 13.0 | 12.4 | 12.5 |


| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 4,162 | 4,276 | 4,412 | 4,630 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(2,310)$ | $(2,439)$ | $(2,515)$ | $(2,616)$ |
| Gross Profit | 1,852 | 1,837 | 1,897 | 2,014 |
| Other Opng (Exp)/Inc | (881) | (950) | (991) | $(1,033)$ |
| Operating Profit | 970 | 887 | 906 | 981 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | (4) | (49) | (49) | (49) |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 67 | 79 | 56 | 49 |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 1,035 | 920 | 915 | 982 |
| Tax | (299) | (275) | (264) | (283) |
| Minority Interest | (6) | (12) | (13) | (14) |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 730 | 634 | 638 | 685 |
| Net Profit before Except. | 730 | 633 | 638 | 685 |
| EBITDA | 1,286 | 1,174 | 1,270 | 1,392 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 9.3 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 4.9 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 15.2 | (8.7) | 8.2 | 9.6 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 12.3 | (8.6) | 2.2 | 8.3 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 12.1 | (13.3) | 0.8 | 7.3 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 28.8 | 29.9 | 28.8 | 28.8 |
| Cash Flow Statement (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 1,035 | 920 | 915 | 982 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 317 | 331 | 411 | 458 |
| Tax Paid | (304) | (280) | (269) | (289) |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | 4 | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | 40 | (338) | 480 | 76 |
| Other Operating CF | (99) | (79) | (56) | (49) |
| Net Operating CF | 1,003 | 603 | 1,531 | 1,229 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | (678) | (645) | $(1,800)$ | $(1,800)$ |
| Other Invts.(net) | (73) | (120) | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | (45) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Investing CF | $(1,715)$ | 1,470 | 25 | 9 |
| Net Investing CF | $(2,511)$ | 705 | $(1,775)$ | $(1,791)$ |
| Div Paid | (450) | (331) | (319) | (343) |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 539 | (270) | 706 | 500 |
| Capital Issues | (7) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | 819 | 223 | (468) | (38) |
| Net Financing CF | 902 | (377) | (82) | 119 |
| Net Cashflow | (606) | 931 | (326) | (443) |

General Data

Issued Capital (m shrs)

| Mkt. Cap (HK\$m/US\$m) | 7,393 / 954 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Major Shareholders |  |
| $\quad$ Chen Jianqiang (\%) | 57.8 |
| $\quad$ International Value Advisers, LLC (\%) | 33.2 |
| Free Float (\%) | 2,133 |
| Avg. Daily Vol.('000) |  |

Price Relative


Balance Sheet (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 6,132 | 6,449 | 8,259 | 9,613 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 302 | 283 | 283 | 283 |
| Other LT Assets | 1,801 | 2,333 | 2,439 | 2,546 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 892 | 1,823 | 1,497 | 1,054 |
| Inventory | 383 | 323 | 448 | 502 |
| Debtors | 13 | 12 | 11 | 12 |
| Other Current Assets | 2,609 | 379 | 444 | 459 |
| Total Assets | 12,132 | 11,601 | 13,381 | 14,468 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ST Debt | 1,872 | 300 | 300 | 300 |
| Other Current Liab | 3,473 | 3,030 | 3,715 | 3,879 |
| LT Debt | 992 | 2,294 | 3,000 | 3,500 |
| Other LT Liabilities | 770 | 781 | 850 | 931 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 4,796 | 4,984 | 5,304 | 5,646 |
| Minority Interests | 230 | 212 | 212 | 212 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 12,132 | 11,601 | 13,381 | 14,468 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | $(467)$ | $(2,316)$ | $(2,812)$ | $(2,907)$ |
| Net Cash/(Debt) | $(1,972)$ | $(772)$ | $(1,803)$ | $(2,746)$ |


| Segmental Breakdown |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Revenues (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| Department stores 1,684 1,703 1,735 1,823 <br> Supermarkets 2,477 2,574 2,677 2,807 <br>      <br> Total $\mathbf{4 , 1 6 2}$ $\mathbf{4 , 2 7 6}$ $\mathbf{4 , 4 1 2}$ $\mathbf{4 , 6 3 0}$ |  |  |  |  |

Source: Company, DBS Vickers

Golden Eagle (HOLD HK\$11.44; 3308 HK; Price Target : HK\$ 11.70)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (RMB m) | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 3,660 | 3,625 | 4,182 | 4,492 |
| EBITDA | 1,723 | 1,596 | 1,802 | 1,973 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 1,708 | 1,538 | 1,629 | 1,770 |
| Net Profit | 1,235 | 1,082 | 1,140 | 1,239 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 1,135 | 970 | 1,110 | 1,239 |
| EPS (HK cts) | 81.7 | 74.7 | 78.7 | 85.5 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (HK cts) | 75.1 | 66.9 | 76.6 | 85.5 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | $(3)$ | $111)$ | 14 | 12 |
| Diluted EPS (HK cts) | 81.3 | 74.7 | 78.7 | 85.5 |
| Net DPS (HK cts) | 23.2 | 29.8 | 30.6 | 34.2 |
| BV Per Share (HK cts) | 345.4 | 373.3 | 425.1 | 480.1 |
| PE (X) | 14.0 | 15.3 | 14.5 | 13.4 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 15.2 | 17.1 | 14.9 | 13.4 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 13.8 | 23.0 | 8.6 | 10.1 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 10.9 | 11.9 | 10.2 | 9.4 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 2.0 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.4 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| ROAE (\%) | 23.4 | 20.3 | 19.7 | 18.9 |


| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 3,660 | 3,625 | 4,182 | 4,492 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(1,017)$ | $(1,045)$ | $(1,184)$ | $(1,213)$ |
| Gross Profit | 2,643 | 2,580 | 2,998 | 3,279 |
| Other Opng (Exp)/Inc | $(1,128)$ | $(1,258)$ | $(1,496)$ | $(1,606)$ |
| Operating Profit | 1,515 | 1,323 | 1,502 | 1,673 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | 13 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 80 | 100 | 97 | 97 |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 100 | 112 | 30 | 0 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 1,708 | 1,538 | 1,629 | 1,770 |
| Tax | (473) | (458) | (489) | (531) |
| Minority Interest | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 1,235 | 1,082 | 1,140 | 1,239 |
| Net Profit before Except. | 1,135 | 970 | 1,110 | 1,239 |
| EBITDA | 1,723 | 1,596 | 1,802 | 1,973 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 1.0 | (0.9) | 15.4 | 7.4 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | (1.0) | (7.4) | 12.9 | 9.5 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | (2.7) | (12.7) | 13.5 | 11.4 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 1.4 | (12.4) | 5.3 | 8.6 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 27.7 | 29.8 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Cash Flow Statement (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 1,708 | 1,538 | 1,629 | 1,770 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 194 | 270 | 300 | 300 |
| Tax Paid | (470) | (454) | (485) | (527) |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | (32) | 8 | 526 | 136 |
| Other Operating CF | (151) | (640) | (47) | (43) |
| Net Operating CF | 1,250 | 722 | 1,923 | 1,635 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | (184) | $(1,061)$ | $(1,500)$ | $(1,500)$ |
| Other Invts.(net) | 107 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | (21) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Investing CF | $(2,281)$ | 607 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Investing CF | $(2,378)$ | (454) | $(1,500)$ | $(1,500)$ |
| Div Paid | (353) | (432) | (444) | (495) |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 2,466 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Capital Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | $(2,419)$ | 344 | (394) | 110 |
| Net Financing CF | (305) | (87) | (838) | (385) |
| Net Cashflow | (1,433) | 18 | (416) | (250) |

General Data

Issued Capital (m shrs)

| Mkt. Cap (HK\$m/US\$m) | $20,433 / 2,636$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Major Shareholders | 70.1 |
| Roger Wang \& ass. (\%) | 29.9 |
| Free Float (\%) | 2,851 |

Price Relative


Balance Sheet (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 4,034 | 6,020 | 6,164 | 7,364 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 255 | 308 | 308 | 308 |
| Other LT Assets | 4,023 | 3,785 | 4,049 | 4,375 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 2,924 | 3,105 | 2,689 | 2,439 |
| Inventory | 354 | 439 | 344 | 369 |
| Debtors | 403 | 505 | 461 | 495 |
| Other Current Assets | 3,081 | 2,356 | 2,553 | 2,553 |
| Total Assets | 15,075 | 16,518 | 16,568 | 17,903 |

ST Debt LT Debt
Other LT Liabilities
Shareholder's Equity
Minority Interests
Total Cap. \& Liab.
Non-Cash Wkg. Capital $\quad(1,365) \quad(2,109) \quad(2,370) \quad(2,821)$
Net Cash/(Debt) $\quad(1,570) \quad(2,430) \quad(1,805) \quad(2,055)$

| Segmental Breakdown | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec |  |  |  |  |
| Revenues (RMB m) | 1,245 | 1,271 | 1,437 | 1,472 |
| Direct sales | 2,320 | 2,213 | 2,539 | 2,781 |
| Commission income | 80 | 142 | 190 | 222 |
| Rental income | 16 | 0 | 17 | 18 |
| Mgt fees |  |  |  |  |
|  | 3,660 | 3,625 | $\mathbf{4 , 1 8 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 , 4 9 2}$ |
| Total |  |  |  |  |

Source: Company, DBS Vickers

Sun Art Retail Group (FULLY VALUED HK\$8.16; 6808 HK; Price Target : HK\$ 5.9)

Forecasts and Valuation

| FY Dec (RMB m) | 2013A | 2014A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Turnover | 86,195 | 91,855 | 96,448 | 103,199 |
| EBITDA | 6,368 | 6,839 | 6,938 | 7,320 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 4,134 | 4,218 | 4,187 | 4,377 |
| Net Profit | 2,775 | 2,908 | 2,835 | 2,964 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 2,775 | 2,908 | 2,835 | 2,964 |
| EPS (HK cts) | 36.2 | 37.9 | 36.9 | 38.6 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (HK cts) | 36.2 | 37.9 | 36.9 | 38.6 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | 16 | 5 | $(3)$ | 5 |
| Diluted EPS (HK cts) | 36.2 | 37.9 | 36.9 | 38.6 |
| Net DPS (HK cts) | 27.5 | 16.2 | 15.8 | 16.5 |
| BV Per Share (HK cts) | 244.2 | 256.3 | 277.4 | 299.5 |
| PE (X) | 22.6 | 21.5 | 22.1 | 21.1 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 22.6 | 21.5 | 22.1 | 21.1 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 9.0 | 11.1 | 9.9 | 9.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 8.8 | 8.5 | 8.4 | 7.9 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 3.4 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 3.3 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.7 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |
| ROAE (\%) | 15.6 | 15.1 | 13.8 | 13.4 |

Income Statement (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 86,195 | 91,855 | 96,448 | 103,199 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(67,582)$ | $(70,857)$ | $(73,783)$ | $(78,431)$ |
| Gross Profit | 18,613 | 20,998 | 22,665 | 24,768 |
| Other Opng (Exp)/Inc | $(14,466)$ | $(16,765)$ | $(18,464)$ | $(20,375)$ |
| Operating Profit | 4,147 | 4,233 | 4,202 | 4,392 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | (13) | (15) | (15) | (15) |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 4,134 | 4,218 | 4,187 | 4,377 |
| Tax | $(1,192)$ | $(1,176)$ | $(1,167)$ | $(1,220)$ |
| Minority Interest | (167) | (134) | (184) | (193) |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 2,775 | 2,908 | 2,835 | 2,964 |
| Net Profit before Except. | 2,775 | 2,908 | 2,835 | 2,964 |
| EBITDA | 6,368 | 6,839 | 6,938 | 7,320 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 10.7 | 6.6 | 5.0 | 7.0 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 16.4 | 7.4 | 1.4 | 5.5 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 17.9 | 2.1 | (0.7) | 4.5 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 15.2 | 4.8 | (2.5) | 4.6 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 28.8 | 27.9 | 27.9 | 27.9 |
| Cash Flow Statement (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 4,134 | 4,218 | 4,187 | 4,377 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 2,221 | 2,606 | 2,736 | 2,928 |
| Tax Paid | $(1,153)$ | $(1,208)$ | $(1,167)$ | $(1,220)$ |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | 2,093 | 232 | 596 | 269 |
| Other Operating CF | (301) | (226) | 0 | 0 |
| Net Operating CF | 6,994 | 5,622 | 6,352 | 6,354 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | $(6,839)$ | $(5,468)$ | $(5,000)$ | $(5,000)$ |
| Other Invts.(net) | 936 | 999 | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Investing CF | 295 | 313 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Investing CF | $(5,608)$ | $(4,156)$ | $(5,000)$ | $(5,000)$ |
| Div Paid | (915) | $(2,124)$ | $(1,213)$ | $(1,268)$ |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Capital Issues | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | 52 | 141 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Financing CF | (863) | $(1,982)$ | $(1,213)$ | $(1,268)$ |
| Net Cashflow | 523 | (516) | 139 | 86 |

Source: Company, DBS Vickers

General Data


Balance Sheet (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 26,953 | 30,062 | 32,326 | 34,398 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other LT Assets | 834 | 938 | 938 | 938 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 7,444 | 6,380 | 6,519 | 6,605 |
| Inventory | 11,268 | 11,161 | 11,891 | 13,571 |
| Debtors | 3,411 | 3,902 | 4,097 | 4,384 |
| Other Current Assets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Assets | 49,910 | 52,443 | 55,771 | 59,896 |

ST Debt

| Other Current Liab | 29,975 | 30,936 | 32,457 | 34,693 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

LT Debt
Other LT Liabilities
Shareholder's Equity
Minority Interests
Non-Cash Wkg. Capital $\quad(15,296)(15,873)(16,469)(16,738)$

| Segmental Breakdown |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Revenues (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| Sales of goods | 83,958 | 89,136 | 93,185 | 99,284 |
| Rental income | 2,237 | 2,719 | 3,263 | 3,915 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 86,195 | 91,855 | 96,448 | 103,199 |

Intime Department Store (HOLD HK\$8.86; 1833 HK; Price Target : HK\$ 6.90)

| Forecasts and Valuation |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec (RMB m) | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| Turnover | 4,510 | 5,251 | 5,943 | 6,376 |
| EBITDA | 1,469 | 1,485 | 1,490 | 1,591 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 2,356 | 1,805 | 1,906 | 1,807 |
| Net Profit | 1,594 | 1,122 | 1,114 | 1,047 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 894 | 852 | 797 | 858 |
| EPS (HK cts) | 99.0 | 66.6 | 62.3 | 58.5 |
| EPS Pre Ex. (HK cts) | 55.5 | 50.5 | 44.5 | 48.0 |
| EPS Gth Pre Ex (\%) | 9 | $(9)$ | $112)$ | 8 |
| Diluted EPS (HK cts) | 73.1 | 51.4 | 51.1 | 48.0 |
| Net DPS (HK cts) | 26.2 | 27.4 | 27.4 | 26.9 |
| BV Per Share (HK cts) | 495.5 | 634.2 | 632.7 | 664.3 |
| PE (X) | 8.9 | 13.3 | 14.2 | 15.1 |
| PE Pre Ex. (X) | 16.0 | 17.5 | 19.9 | 18.5 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 9.0 | 12.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 11.9 | 12.3 | 12.7 | 11.7 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.0 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| ROAE (\%) | 20.9 | 12.0 | 10.1 | 9.0 |



General Data

Major Shareholders

Price Relative
General Data


Alibaba (\%) 9.9
GIC Private Limited (\%) 7.0
Free Float (\%) 50.8
Avg. Daily Vol.('000) 22,034


Balance Sheet (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 8,115 | 11,693 | 12,163 | 12,613 |
| Invts in Associates \& JVs | 2,609 | 2,808 | 2,808 | 2,808 |
| Other LT Assets | 4,068 | 4,173 | 4,173 | 4,173 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 3,527 | 3,907 | 4,361 | 4,694 |
| Inventory | 484 | 495 | 560 | 601 |
| Debtors | 2,849 | 3,015 | 3,019 | 3,022 |
| Other Current Assets | 905 | 1,702 | 1,702 | 1,702 |
| Total Assets | 22,556 | 27,793 | 28,787 | 29,614 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ST Debt | 2,708 | 1,121 | 1,121 | 1,121 |
| Other Current Liab | 7,060 | 9,076 | 9,350 | 9,522 |
| LT Debt | 3,045 | 5,055 | 5,055 | 5,055 |
| Other LT Liabilities | 7441 | 761 | 761 | 761 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 7,980 | 10,695 | 11,319 | 11,884 |
| Minority Interests | 1,023 | 1,086 | 1,181 | 1,272 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 22,556 | 27,794 | 28,787 | 29,614 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | $(2,822)$ | $(3,865)$ | $(4,069)$ | $(4,197)$ |
| Net Cash/(Debt) | $(2,226)$ | $(2,268)$ | $(1,815)$ | $(1,481)$ |


| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015 F | 2016F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 4,510 | 5,251 | 5,943 | 6,376 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(1,554)$ | $(1,406)$ | $(1,508)$ | $(1,628)$ |
| Gross Profit | 2,956 | 3,845 | 4,435 | 4,748 |
| Other Opng (Exp)/Inc | $(1,874)$ | $(2,816)$ | $(3,476)$ | $(3,707)$ |
| Operating Profit | 1,083 | 1,029 | 960 | 1,041 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | 256 | 309 | 326 | 346 |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 55 | 48 | 120 | 120 |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 963 | 420 | 500 | 300 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 2,356 | 1,805 | 1,906 | 1,807 |
| Tax | (642) | (641) | (696) | (670) |
| Minority Interest | (119) | (42) | (95) | (90) |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 1,594 | 1,122 | 1,114 | 1,047 |
| Net Profit before Except. | 632 | 703 | 614 | 747 |
| EBITDA | 1,469 | 1,485 | 1,490 | 1,591 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | 15.4 | 16.4 | 13.2 | 7.3 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | 19.2 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 6.8 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | 27.4 | (5.0) | (6.7) | 8.5 |
| Net Profit Gth (\%) | 63.9 | (29.6) | (0.7) | (6.0) |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 27.3 | 35.5 | 36.5 | 37.1 |
| Cash Flow Statement (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 2,356 | 1,805 | 1,906 | 1,807 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 386 | 456 | 530 | 550 |
| Tax Paid | (336) | (641) | (696) | (670) |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | (256) | (309) | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | (105) | 296 | 204 | 128 |
| Other Operating CF | 107 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Operating CF | 1,586 | 1,188 | 1,943 | 1,815 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | $(2,421)$ | $(1,900)$ | $(1,000)$ | $(1,000)$ |
| Other Invts.(net) | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 150 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Investing CF | 398 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Investing CF | $(1,849)$ | $(1,900)$ | $(1,000)$ | $(1,000)$ |
| Div Paid | (383) | (462) | (490) | (482) |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 934 | (38) | 0 | 0 |
| Capital Issues | 65 | 1,328 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | (36) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Financing CF | 581 | 828 | (490) | (482) |
| Net Cashflow | 318 | 116 | 453 | 334 |

Source: Company, DBS Vickers

Income Statement (RMB m)

Parkson (3368 HK Equity, HK\$1.92, Fully Valued,Target Price HK\$ 1.82)

| Forecast \& Valuation |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Dec (RMB m) | $2013 A$ | 2014 A | $2015 F$ | $2016 F$ |
| Turnover | 5,110 | 5,015 | 5,294 | 5,602 |
| EBITDA | 967 | 760 | 931 | 995 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 611 | 377 | 389 | 575 |
| Net Profit | 354 | 235 | 244 | 368 |
| Net Pft (Pre Ex.) | 354 | 235 | 384 | 368 |
| EPS (RMB) | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.13 |
| EPS (HK\$) | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.16 |
| EPS Gth (\%) | $(58.4)$ | $(33.6)$ | 3.7 | 50.9 |
| Diluted EPS (HK\$) | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.16 |
| DPS (HK\$) | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| BV Per Share (HK\$) | 2.49 | 2.48 | 2.54 | 2.63 |
| PE (X) | 12.2 | 18.4 | 17.8 | 11.8 |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 6.8 | 12.6 | 4.0 | 3.8 |
| P/Free CF (X) | 22.0 | 111.0 | 7.4 | 6.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 3.0 | 4.6 | 3.3 | 2.8 |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 3.9 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 3.8 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Net Debt/Equity (X) | CASH | CASH | CASH | CASH |
| ROAE (\%) | 6.3 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 6.3 |


|  |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| General Data |  |
| Issued Capital (m shrs) | 2,729 |
| Mkt. Cap (HK\$m/US\$m) | 5,252 / 678 |
| Major Shareholders |  |
| Parkson Holdings (\%) | 53.1 |
| Golden Eagle International Retail Group (\%) | 7.7 |
| Pangkor Investments (\%) | 6.7 |
| Prudential plc (\%) | 6.1 |
| Free Float (\%) | 26.5 |
| Avg. Daily Vol.('000) | 4,775 |
| Price Relative |  |



Balance Sheet (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013 A | 2014 A | 2015 F | 2016 F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 3,830 | 3,751 | 3,886 | 4,046 |
| Invts in Assocs \& JVs | 40 | 28 | 28 | 28 |
| Other LT Assets | 3,314 | 4,076 | 4,022 | 3,980 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 4,671 | 4,657 | 5,013 | 5,337 |
| Inventory | 342 | 341 | 363 | 384 |
| Debtors | 94 | 86 | 91 | 96 |
| Other Current Assets | 1,416 | 1,000 | 1,056 | 1,117 |
| Total Assets | 13,706 | 13,939 | 14,459 | 14,988 |

ST Debt

|  | 0 | 700 | 700 | 700 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Other Current Liab | 4,062 | 3,619 | 3,942 | 4,179 |
| LT Debt | 3,196 | 3,035 | 3,017 | 3,017 |


| Other LT Liabilities | 766 | 926 | 1,003 | 1,090 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Shareholder's Equity | 5,597 | 5,587 | 5,721 | 5,923 |
| Minority Interests | 85 | 72 | 76 | 79 |

Minority Interests
Total Cap. \& Liab.
Non-Cash Wkg. Cap
Net Cash/(Debt)

Segmental Breakdown (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Revenues (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| $\quad$ Sales of goods - direct sales | 1,577 | 1,645 | 1,645 | 1,741 |
| $\quad$ Commission from | 2,665 | 2,555 | 2,807 | 2,970 |
| concessionaire sales |  |  |  |  |
| $\quad$ Consultancy and | 13 | 15 | 14 | 15 |
| Rental income | 281 | 309 | 294 | 311 |
| $\quad$ Other revenue | 574 | 491 | 534 | 566 |
| Total | 5,110 | 5,015 | 5,294 | 5,602 |

ance sicet (ivid im)

T Debt

| 5,597 | 5,587 | 5,721 | 5,923 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 85 | 72 | 76 | 79 |
| 13,706 | 13,939 | 14,459 | 14,988 |


| $(2,211)$ | $(2,192)$ | $(2,433)$ | $(2,582)$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1,475 | 922 | 1,296 | 1,621 |

Income Statement (RMB m)

| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Turnover | 5,110 | 5,015 | 5,294 | 5,602 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $(1,334)$ | $(1,413)$ | $(1,415)$ | $(1,497)$ |
| Gross Profit | 3,777 | 3,602 | 3,879 | 4,105 |
| Other Opg (Exp)/Inc | $(3,233)$ | $(3,277)$ | $(3,401)$ | $(3,581)$ |
| Operating Profit | 543 | 325 | 478 | 524 |
| Other Non Opg (Exp)/Inc | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associates \& JV Inc | 36 | 31 | 30 | 30 |
| Net Interest (Exp)/Inc | 32 | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| Dividend Income | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Exceptional Gain/(Loss) | 0 | 0 | (140) | 0 |
| Pre-tax Profit | 611 | 377 | 389 | 575 |
| Tax | (239) | (131) | (133) | (194) |
| Minority Interest | (19) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
| Preference Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Profit | 354 | 235 | 244 | 368 |
| Net profit before Except. | 354 | 235 | 384 | 368 |
| EBITDA | 967 | 760 | 931 | 995 |
| Sales Gth (\%) | (0.6) | (1.9) | 5.6 | 5.8 |
| EBITDA Gth (\%) | (31.7) | (21.4) | 22.6 | 6.8 |
| Opg Profit Gth (\%) | (51.6) | (40.2) | 47.2 | 9.7 |
| Effective Tax Rate (\%) | 39.0 | 34.8 | 34.3 | 33.8 |
| Cash Flow Statement (RMB m) |  |  |  |  |
| FY Dec | 2013A | 2014A | 2015F | 2016F |
| Pre-Tax Profit | 611 | 377 | 389 | 575 |
| Dep. \& Amort. | 388 | 404 | 423 | 441 |
| Tax Paid | (312) | (171) | (174) | (254) |
| Assoc. \& JV Inc/(loss) | (36) | (31) | (30) | (30) |
| (Pft)/ Loss on disposal of FAs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Wkg.Cap. | 3 | (424) | 287 | 199 |
| Other Operating CF | (14) | 189 | 193 | 200 |
| Net Operating CF | 640 | 344 | 1,089 | 1,131 |
| Capital Exp.(net) | (443) | (305) | (500) | (500) |
| Other Invts.(net) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Invts in Assoc. \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Div from Assoc \& JV | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other Investing CF | (807) | (87) | 183 | 179 |
| Net Investing CF | $(1,251)$ | (392) | (317) | (321) |
| Div Paid | (337) | (305) | (110) | (166) |
| Chg in Gross Debt | 675 | 521 | 0 | 0 |
| Capital Issues | 0 | (97) | 0 | 0 |
| Other Financing CF | (216) | 0 | (409) | (320) |
| Net Financing CF | 122 | 119 | (518) | (485) |
| Currency Adjustments | (4) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chg in Cash | (493) | 71 | 254 | 324 |

FJ Benjamin (NOT RATED S\$0.134; FJB SP)

| Forecasts and Valuation |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| FY Jun (S\$ m) | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| Turnover | 353.9 | 393.2 | 373.4 | 368.2 |
| EBITDA | 24.8 | 26.5 | 12.0 | $(1.3)$ |
| Pre-tax Profit | 17.0 | 19.7 | 7.3 | $(19.2)$ |
| Net Profit | 13.0 | 13.9 | 4.4 | $(22.1)$ |
| EPS (S cts) | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | $(0.04)$ |
| EPS Gth (\%)) | 57.2 | 7.0 | $(68.0)$ | $(598.7)$ |
| Net DPS (S\$) | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| BV Per Share (S\$) | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| PE (X) | 16.0 | 13.1 | 32.1 |  |
| P/Cash Flow (X) | 39.1 |  |  | 13.9 |
| EV/EBITDA (X) | 8.6 | 8.8 | 17.2 |  |
| Net Div Yield (\%) | 5.5 | 3.1 | 2.0 | 1.3 |
| P/Book Value (X) | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
| Total Debt/Equity (X) | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| ROA (\%) | 5.1 | 5.3 | 1.6 | $(8.4)$ |
| ROE (\%) | 9.6 | 10.5 | 3.3 | $(18.9)$ |

General Data


Balance Sheet (S\$ m)

| FY Jun | 2011A | 2012A | 2013 A | 2014 A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Net Fixed Assets | 29.8 | 31.7 | 27.1 | 30.6 |
| Other LT Assets | 14.6 | 30.2 | 28.5 | 19.5 |
| Cash \& ST Invts | 38.4 | 14.7 | 13.9 | 7.9 |
| Inventory | 94.4 | 110.4 | 117.7 | 90.5 |
| A/Cs \& Notes Receivable | 57.6 | 58.9 | 64.8 | 69.8 |
| Other Current Assets | 22.5 | 25.9 | 24.4 | 30.8 |
| Total Assets | 257.3 | 271.9 | 276.4 | 249.0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Short Term Borrowings | 44.9 | 59.7 | 73.9 | 77.3 |
| Creditor / Accounts Payable | 53.1 | 37.7 | 40.8 | 58.6 |
| Other Current Liab | 24.1 | 30.7 | 23.2 | 0.5 |
| LT Borrowings | 0.8 | 7.2 | 5.1 | 7.9 |
| Other LT Borrowings | 3.0 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
| Shareholder's Equity | 131.5 | 133.6 | 130.5 | 101.9 |
| Total Cap. \& Liab. | 257.3 | 271.9 | 276.4 | 249.0 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-Cash Wkg. Capital | 52.5 | 67.2 | 73.2 | 57.4 |
| Net Debt/Cash | 7.3 | 52.1 | 65.1 | 77.3 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Rates \& Ratio

| FY Jun | 2011A | 2012A | 2013A | 2014A |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Gross Margins (\%) | 42.8 | 42.8 | 42.7 | 39.1 |
| Opg Profit Margin (\%) | 5.2 | 4.9 | 1.1 | -2.9 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | 3.7 | 3.5 | 1.2 | -6.0 |
| ROAE (\%) | 9.6 | 10.5 | 3.3 | -18.9 |
| ROA (\%) | 5.1 | 5.3 | 1.6 | -8.4 |
| Div Payout Ratio (\%) | 87.7 | 40.9 | 64.0 |  |
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 |
| A/Cs Receivable Turnover | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.0 | 5.5 |
| A/Cs Payable Turnover | 4.3 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 4.0 |
| Inventory Turn | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.2 |
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Interest Coverage Ratio | 10.5 | 7.3 | 1.3 | -3.0 |
| Tot Debt/Capital | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Tot Debt/Equity | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| Free Cash Flow (CFO-CAPEX) | -2.5 | -16.8 | -21.5 | -8.4 |
| Free Cash Flow per Share | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |

## DBS Bank Ltd recommendations are based an Absolute Total Return* Rating system, defined as follows:

STRONG BUY (>20\% total return over the next 3 months, with identifiable share price catalysts within this time frame)
BUY ( $>15 \%$ total return over the next 12 months for small caps, $>10 \%$ for large caps)
HOLD ( $-10 \%$ to $+15 \%$ total return over the next 12 months for small caps, $-10 \%$ to $+10 \%$ for large caps)
FULLY VALUED (negative total return i.e. >-10\% over the next 12 months)
SELL (negative total return of >-20\% over the next 3 months, with identifiable catalysts within this time frame)
Share price appreciation + dividends

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[^0]:    Source: Euromonitor, Companies, DBS Bank

[^1]:    Source: Euromonitor, Companies, DBS Bank

